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Abstract

Two decades ago, Aerospace Medical Technicians received robust skills
sustainment training through exposure to multi-faceted patient treatment environments.
Available training environments included inpatient care, outpatient care, and emergency
services. This diverse training environment made possible through large operating
budgets and an extraordinary infrastructure could not last.
Today (after five separate base closure and realignment initiatives), medical
funding and infrastructure is but a shadow of what it once was. Budget constraints and
the rising cost of healthcare have necessitated a purposeful movement away from
inpatient and emergency care, toward outpatient and preventative medicine.
Although changes in Air Force health care delivery may be necessary, the closure
of inpatient units and emergency service departments around the Air Force has
significantly impacted the Air Force's ability to train medical professionals and
paraprofessionals for operations in a deployed setting, especially in the area of medical
skills sustainment training. This research attempts to provide an alternate model for
aerospace medical skills sustainment training that will assist students and trainers in
overcoming the training limitations realized in a training environment plagued by
budgetary constraints and the near complete loss of inpatient and emergency services.
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CONTEMPLATING A NEW MODEL FOR AIR FORCE AEROSPACE
MEDICAL TECHNICIAN SKILLS SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

I. Introduction
Background:
Aerospace Medical Technicians have diligently performed their role in ensuring
the highest degree of combat readiness for the United States since the early days of the
Army Air Corps. For nearly sixty years, they have provided quality health care for
present and former members of the profession of arms and for their families. Today,
these dedicated professionals continue to provide exceptional care both in the field and in
the medical treatment facility. Through selfless devotion to duty, Aerospace Medical
Technicians serve as highly skilled and valuable assets to combatant commanders and
their tenant units.
While a number of capabilities and qualities have contributed to the success of
Air Force Medics over the years, perhaps the greatest quality attributed to these altruistic
professionals is their remarkable versatility. The typical Aerospace Medical Technician
effortlessly transitions between work assignments: extensive training enables him or her
to perform duties within the medical treatment facility (MTF) or in a pre-hospital
environment.
While performing in the MTF, the medical technician is often called upon to
assist in a number of various work centers. Thus, the technician must assimilate and
store the knowledge required to perform countless duties and critical tasks associated
with providing exceptional medical care in any number of outpatient clinics or inpatient
units. For the aerospace medical technician, it is not sufficient to master the tasks of
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one’s assigned work-center. The technician must develop a basic skill set that allows him
or her to be utilized in numerous locations throughout the medical treatment facility.
Additionally, Aerospace Medical technicians must complete rigorous training to
gain status as a Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician. Emergency
Medical Technician training significantly enlarges the role of the aerospace medical
technician. Upon completing the training, the technician often provides emergency care
and transport for the sick and injured outside of the hospital environment. This training
also assists the technician in developing the core competencies necessary to perform
duties in a forward or deployed environment.
Throughout the history of aerospace medical technicians, the fundamental
ingredient responsible for their demonstrated versatility and proficiency has been an
extensive training program. In the past, technicians experienced the luxury of receiving
ongoing training that provided exposure to a number of different work centers. Most Air
Force bases maintained medical centers that boasted outpatient clinics, inpatient units,
and emergency services. The multifaceted nature of the typical Air Force medical
treatment facility proved very beneficial to medical technicians as it afforded them
opportunity to gain valuable exposure to various work environments, thereby sharpening
their medical skills for potential deployments during peacetime and war.
Unfortunately, the robust training experience of the past is somewhat diminished
today. While the typical medical technician still receives exceptional initial training to
prepare him or her for duty in a wide variety of work environments, more often than not,
his or her first duty assignment will involve a base that no longer offers inpatient care or
emergency services. As a result, the technician is generally assigned to an outpatient
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clinic where he or she is unable to practice tasks and principles that deal with inpatient
and emergency treatment.
The inability to practice inpatient and emergency treatment skills may lead to dire
circumstances. Important knowledge gained through effective technical training is not
reinforced, and as a result, the technician’s basic skill set begins to decline shortly after
completing initial technical training. In more succinct terms, the medical technician soon
forgets a great deal of the curriculum taught during Phase I and Phase II technical
training because he or she has little opportunity to put the knowledge gained through
training into practice. Without exposure to in-patient units and the emergency medicine
setting, the technician loses a valuable opportunity to experience and master a number of
core tasks and critical wartime skills.
As it stands today, the majority of modern Air Force Aerospace Medical
Technicians perform their duties in a clinical environment. This phenomenon makes it
extremely difficult for trainers to provide required wartime related instruction for
subordinates. The injuries and illnesses treated in outpatient clinics during peacetime do
not adequately prepare medics for the extensive injuries typical of most battlefield
scenarios.
In years past (when DOD facilities typically offered inpatient and emergency
services), even medics assigned to outpatient clinics could still obtain valuable hands on
training by assisting in the emergency service department or the inpatient units during
periods of increased volume or high patient census. Now, unless the technician is
fortunate enough to be assigned to a major medical center, he or she will have virtually
no opportunity to practice inpatient or emergency care skills. As the opportunity to
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practice these skills continues to decline, the level of tacit knowledge maintained by
Aerospace Medical Technicians continues to decrease as well. Knowledge atrophy with
respect to inpatient and emergency medical care is further exacerbated each year as more
and more inpatient units and emergency service departments close their doors. Most of
these facilities close as a result of base closure and realignment initiatives, but others
close in order to comply with a cost driven shift away from inpatient and emergency
medical care toward outpatient and preventative medicine.
As more and more medical treatment facilities are realigned to exclusively
perform outpatient services, inpatient and emergency medical knowledge has slowly
degraded. This results in a decreased skill set for Aerospace Medical Technicians.
Further, because competency has been defined as a combination of knowledge and skill,
the level of competency demonstrated by technicians whose experience is limited to
outpatient clinics is also somewhat diminished.
The loss of divergent competency attributed to clinically trained technicians poses
a real problem for deployed medical commanders. Too often, commanders discover that
assigned medics have little or no inpatient or emergency medicine experience. This
being the case, technicians are unable to perform many of the inpatient and emergency
medicine duties associated with an assignment to a deployed location. Thus, arriving
medics must receive extensive training at the deployment site.
Unfortunately, the aforementioned disparity between peacetime and wartime
competencies for the typical Aerospace Medical Technician continues to grow as
seasoned technicians (those who have inpatient and emergency medicine experience)
depart the service after fulfilling their commitment. When these technicians depart, they
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take with them a wealth of tacit knowledge that may be very difficult to recapture. After
those technicians with inpatient and emergency medicine experience depart, who will
provide necessary inpatient and emergency war-time skills training in an era of outpatient
medicine?
Senior Air Force Medical Planners have recognized that changes realized through
multiple Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiatives, through extensive
outsourcing programs, and through several force shaping campaigns have imposed some
real limitations on the remaining medical force. Perhaps, the most notable limitations
imposed by these changes manifest themselves in the training arena. Training issues and
the lack of experience demonstrated by outpatient personnel represent major management
issues for senior medical personnel. In fact, senior medical planners regarded these
issues as important enough to warrant discussion during the Corona Leadership
Conference of 2005.
Unfortunately, senior medical planners were not the only parties taking note of
current training issues in the Air Force medical community. The Air Force Inspection
Agency also became somewhat alarmed when they discovered several training
deficiencies during Health Services Inspections conducted during 2004 and 2005. The
biggest deficiencies documented by inspectors involved the inability of supervisors to
develop effective master training plans that provided adequate training for 100% of the
tasks performed within the various work-centers (Hanks, 2005:18). But, other problems
were noted as well.
Because Aerospace Medical Technicians perform a significant role in the delivery
of quality medical care, training issues relating to knowledge and competency necessitate
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an immediate response on the part of senior medical planners. Of course, any logical
response, should commence with a formal definition of the problem.
Deriving the Study Proposition and Purpose Statement:
The problems briefly described in the narrative above have not escaped the
attention of senior medical planners. Current problems affecting the training of
Aerospace Medical Technicians have been identified through official Air Force channels
(the Air Force Inspection Agency, senior medical planners, and trainers/supervisors in the
field). However, substantial disagreement persists in describing the nature and cause of
these problems. While some Health Service Inspection (HSI) inspectors attribute
problems to ineffective command and supervisory involvement, a number of unit training
managers suggest that problems are the direct result of poor documentation on the part of
supervisors.
As an aerospace medical technician who has experienced the problem firsthand, I
feel neither of these explanations fully describe the problems observed. Having served as
a trainer, task certifier, and supervisor in the Aerospace Technician Career Field for over
17 years, I view these problems as being far more complex. Current aerospace medical
technician training issues are not resolvable through increased supervisory and command
involvement, nor will they be eradicated through improved unit documentation. While
these steps may prove useful in controlling some of the symptoms associated with the
aforementioned problems, they will not resolve problem specific issues. Most certainly,
current aerospace medical technician training problems will require a far more
comprehensive plan for resolution.
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In scientific terms, the problems experienced in training aerospace medical
technicians are a direct application of the law of unintended consequences. This law
holds that the “actions of people—and especially of governments—always have effects
that are unanticipated or unintended” (Norton, 2006:1). Base closures, outsourcing, and
force shaping have resulted in substantial savings for the United States Government and
the United States Air Force. However, an unanticipated consequence of base closures,
outsourcing, and downsizing is manifested through our inability to provide an adequate
skills sustainment training environment for medical technicians. The training methods
that proved so effective only a few decades ago, have somehow lost their effectiveness.
Outsourcing, base closures, force-shaping initiatives, and a concerted movement toward
outpatient medicine have effectively changed the traditional aerospace medical training
environment forever.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to effective future training involves the failure of
senior medics to recognize the depth and breadth of these changes. An article describing
some of the problems surrounding medical training appeared in the July-August, 2005
issue of the TIG Brief Magazine. In this article, CMSgt Jody Hanks, a veteran health
services inspector assigned to the Air Force Inspection Agency’s Medical Operations
Directorate, asserted that an effective on-the-job training (OJT) program is still possible
if supervisors take the time to develop effective master training plans (MTPs) and
appropriately apply the Instructional System Development (ISD) model to training
initiatives. He further supported his assertion by stating, “The On-the-Job Training
Program is no mystery. After all, the Air Force has not significantly changed the way
we’ve conducted and documented On-the-Job Training in 20 years (Hanks, 2005:19).”
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Chief Hanks does not stand alone in his assertion. Many senior medical planners
feel that we should not be experiencing any problems with aerospace medical technician
training, because we have not changed the manner in which we conduct and document
enlisted medical training for a number of years. Unfortunately, everything remotely
related to medical training in the Air Force has changed. That is, of course, everything
except how we conduct and document training. In other words, while it is true that we
have not changed the medical training model for over 20 years, everything surrounding
the training model, everything the model is built upon, has changed. The training
environment has changed in as much as we have witnessed a transformation in primary
focus from inpatient and emergency care to outpatient care. The nature and availability
of relevant training resources has changed. The number of trainers with inpatient and
emergency medicine experience that is readily applicable to battlefield medicine has
changed. The level of tacit knowledge available at the various medical treatment
facilities has changed. The funding levels for medical skills sustainment training have
changed. Everything remotely related to the model has changed.
It is because of these changes that a new training model should be developed and
implemented. The days of large training budgets and in place high fidelity medical
readiness training are well behind us. Additional drivers for a new model include present
and future budgetary constraints, as well as advances in technology.
The notion of a new training model for Aerospace Medical Technicians has
transcended the question of “Do we need to build it?” By all indications, the answer is a
resounding “Yes!” Fortunately, Air Force Medical Planners are a resourceful lot, and
where they must, they will find a way to ensure optimal medical readiness. The only
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question that remains is when will we see the new training model implemented. It is our
hope, that the necessary model will be developed quickly. Having provided this brief
background, the thesis now turns to an introduction of the overarching proposition
addressed by this research.
Study Proposition:
While IG inspectors and some senior medical planners suggest there should be no
problem conducting training in the medical environment (“because nothing has changed
in our training methods over the last 20 years”), this research explores the proposition
that everything encompassing the medical training environment has changed. If this is,
indeed, the case, then the methodology and model employed to conduct skills
sustainment training should change in order to minimize the effects of limited resources
realized in a training environment plagued by right sizing and base closures. Such a
model must also prove robust against a paradigm shift away from inpatient and
emergency care toward preventative medicine, outpatient services, and outsourcing.
Thus the fundamental question addressed by this research effort becomes: What must
change with respect to the current medical skills sustainment training model if we hope to
maintain optimal levels of medical readiness for Aerospace Medical Technicians?
Purpose Statement:
The purpose of this research is multi-faceted. The first objective of the study
involves establishing the need for an alternate training model for Aerospace Medical
Technician skills sustainment training. The second objective involves the development
and introduction of an alternate training model that could potentially be implemented for
medical skills sustainment training within the aerospace medical technician career field.
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The efficacy of the model will not be tested as part of this study; however, such testing
could be the subject of future research. In order to successfully complete these
objectives, a number of research questions are suggested. The research questions will
frame the remainder of the research.
Research Questions:
Research Question 1:
What is the present model used to provide Air Force Aerospace Medical Technician
skills sustainment training?
Research Question 2:
Have there been recent changes to the aerospace medical skills sustainment training
environment that may contribute to the success or failure of the current model?
Research Question 3:
What indicators might suggest the current model has not successfully ensured medical
readiness for Aerospace Medical Technicians?
Research Question 4:
What type of training model could enhance Aerospace Medical Technician skills while
satisfying contemporary budgetary constraints?
Investigative Questions:
To facilitate a deeper exploration of the research questions listed above, the
following supplemental investigative questions are suggested:
Investigative Question for Research Question 1:
What is the evidence suggesting a formal model for aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training?
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Investigative Question for Research Question 2:
What changes have occurred with respect to land, labor, capital, and the nature of work?
Investigative Question for Research Question 3:
What insights can be gained from Air Force Lessons Learned with respect to Aerospace
Medical Technician skills sustainment training?
Investigative Question for Research Question 4:
What are some of the problem areas the new model should address?
Methodology:
The overarching framework for this research effort will be an exploratory,
embedded, single case study. A mixed methods research approach will be applied in an
effort to discover and understand the nature and complexity of the problems described.
The referenced approach will include historical analysis of the Aerospace Medical
Technician career field, content analysis of reported lessons learned, and the presentation
and interpretation of survey data provided by the Air Force Occupational and
Measurement Squadron at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.
Statistical techniques will include simple descriptive methods and multiple
applications of analysis of variance. The analysis of variance technique will be used to
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between home-station and deployed
Aerospace Medical Technician training environments with respect to the percentage of
technicians performing Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP) specific tasks.
Finally, a proportion of agreement statistic will be calculated in an attempt to validate
research assertions derived from content analysis of Air Force Operations News Medical
Lessons Learned.
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Benefits of Research:
This research will establish the necessity for and provide a potential alternate
training model for Aerospace Medical Technicians skills sustainment training. It is the
hope of the researcher that the suggested training model will enable meaningful and
lasting knowledge transfer for Aerospace Medical Technicians, thereby increasing
existing levels of medical readiness. Further benefits of the study may be derived if the
model proves applicable to other medical and non-medical career fields throughout the
Department of Defense (DOD).
Thesis Overview:
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 provided a brief introduction
and stated the problem addressed by the study. A limited background concerning the
problem was presented, and the basic methodology applied to the research was discussed.
Chapter 2 will provide some background information through an extensive literature
review. The literature review will explore the nature of the problem in more detail while
lending proof support and clarification support to the chapters that follow. In Chapter 3,
the methodology used for data collection and data interpretation will be discussed in
detail. Chapter 4 involves a discussion of the data derived from the application of the
chosen methodology and the results of data analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 provides
discussion regarding potential applications of the research, as well as future research
opportunities and limitations encountered.
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II. Literature Review
Initial Aerospace Medical Technician Training:
As stated in the introduction, Air Force Aerospace Medical Technicians boast a
distinguished and honorable history traceable to the early days of the Army Air Corps.
Review of the available literature revealed that early Army Air Corps Medics (the precursors to modern aerospace medical technicians) received their training through
traditional Army ground forces training schools. Upon completing their coursework,
selected ground force medics were assigned to elite Army Air Corps units (Parks,
1974:213).
Overall, the number of enlisted personnel receiving medical training was quite
conservative during the early years. However, the number of trainees began to increase
substantially following the introduction of the Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization
Plan, which was published in December of 1939. This plan effectively commenced a
pre-war expansion initiative that improved the quality of medical technician training for
enlisted soldiers (Hester, 1939:7).
Prior to the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, Army medical and surgical
enlisted technicians received all of their training on the job. After the Protective
Mobilization Plan was introduced, Army Air Corps medics of the pre-war expansion era
received formal classroom training at one of five established training centers. These
centers included the Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., William Beaumont
Hospital, El Paso Texas, Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colorado, Letterman
General Hospital, San Francisco, California, and the Army and Navy Hospital, Hot
Springs, Arkansas (Parks, 1974:213).
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Senior medical planners soon realized that training offered through the
aforementioned medical training centers provided many necessary skills, but failed to
prepare Army medics adequately for the realities of war and field service. Thus, the
Army established special schools to provide more tangible and realistic training for
medics. These courses offered through newly added facilities emphasized pre-hospital
care and field medicine.
One such school chartered to train Army Air Force medical enlisted personnel
was the Army Air Force Medical Service Training School established in 1942. Later
designated the 25th Army Air Force Base Unit, Robins Field, Georgia, this school was
home to most of the enlisted medical technicians trained for the Army Air Forces during
World War II (Crowder, 1993:1).
From the inception of the Army Air Forces, senior Air Force leaders stressed the
importance of adequate training for enlisted personnel and the medical specialty was no
exception. Senior Army Air Force medical personnel believed the nature and frequency
of flight related injuries necessitated flight specific field medical training. Based on this
belief, Army Air Force medical planners began to lobby for enhanced training for their
enlisted medics. Their efforts led to the development of a special field-medicine training
course (later dubbed the Army Air Forces Medical Service Training Field Course) at
Robins Field. The purpose of this course was to prepare medical and surgical technicians
for duty with the field units of the Army Air Forces (Nanney, 1998:9).
It is interesting to note that Air Force medical planners recognized the need for
additional field training separate from the rigid academic environment experienced at the
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Army Air Forces Medical Service Training School. Senior medical personnel identified
the importance of combat specific training from the earliest days of the Army Air Force.
Actual battlefield commanders provided input regarding the development of the
field-training course. Shortly after the development of initial enlisted medical training
programs, it became apparent to combatant commanders that technicians who trained
exclusively in the hospital environment did not perform very well in the field. After
commanders voiced this concern to academic planners, the planners began to recognize
that enlisted medics must receive additional field or combat related medical training if
they were to perform adequately at forward based locations. Thus, Army Air Force
medics began to receive additional training in rendering emergency care through the
field-training course. Relevant subjects of instruction included wound management,
medication administration, anesthesia and immunization principles, control of
hemorrhage and shock, care of musculoskeletal injuries, chemical exposure treatment,
casualty management procedures, and war neurosis management (Crowder, 1993:2).
After taking the time to reflect upon the many accomplishments of the first Air
Force enlisted medical curriculum designers, it is somewhat surprising to discover how
little the design of initial enlisted medical instruction has changed over the years. Even
before the Air Force became a separate service, the medical technicians of the Army Air
Forces received initial training in much the same way that our technicians receive
training today. Many of the major components of our current initial training model were
implemented successfully. These components included formal classroom instruction, onthe-job training at one of several training hospitals, and combat focused medical
readiness training (Mosley, 1944:1).
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When considering the similarities between past and present initial training for
medical technicians, it appears as though the initial training development model has
withstood the test of time. Indeed, the technical training program developed at the USAF
School of Health Care Sciences at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas continues to produce
highly qualified and highly knowledgeable technicians. Instruction received through
actual formal attendance in the Aerospace Medical Apprentice Courses at Sheppard Air
Force Base satisfies the first phase (Phase 1) of initial aerospace medical technician
training.
In a second phase of training (Phase 2), knowledge gained through the Phase 1
program is reinforced through hands-on immersion training at one of the various Air
Force training hospitals (typically major medical centers). Phase 2 facilities expose
technicians to a number of medical disciplines. Students experience inpatient medicine,
outpatient medicine, and emergency medicine first hand.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of medical skills sustainment training.
Most technicians of today are not afforded the luxury of working in a medical treatment
facility that offers inpatient medicine, outpatient medicine, and emergency services. This
lack of exposure to various work environments is somewhat new. Technicians from the
earliest inception of the Air Force, through the early 1990s were provided opportunities
to work in inpatient and emergency service departments. This provided the opportunity
for technicians to enhance their knowledge and skill everyday on the job in a form of
skills immersion training very similar to the Phase 2 initial training experienced by
aerospace medical apprentices.
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Nearly every hospital offered a multi-faceted training environment because,
unlike today, most military hospitals offered both emergency medicine and inpatient
medical care. Thus, there were more opportunities for previous medics to practice
combat related inpatient and emergency medical treatment skills. Those were the glory
days; days when Air Force medics could fall back on their extensive training from the
inpatient and emergency treatment arenas to help them provide quality care during
wartime and peacetime operations.
Today, however, only a handful of military hospitals offer inpatient and
emergency medicine services. The provision of these services is limited to major medical
centers, and only a few medics are fortunate enough to be assigned to these larger
facilities. Thus, the number of Air Force medics with inpatient and emergency medicine
experience is rapidly declining.
In further explanation, because there are only a few major medical centers today,
there is little chance the student will be assigned to a major medical center after
completing Phase 2 of initial training. Thus, years or even decades may pass before a
technician is afforded the opportunity to practice the inpatient or emergency medicine
skills he or she learned during initial technical training.
When considering the immense infrastructural and philosophical changes in
reference to the provision of medical care within our facilities, a seminal question arises
that must be addressed by senior medical planners if the Air Force is to continue
providing excellent services for its patients. The question the Air Force must address is
of course: How can we prevent the erosion of knowledge and skill gained through initial
training once technicians are assigned to an environment that offers almost no
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opportunity to put acquired knowledge and skill into practice? This question is not easily
answered, and it may be years before we fully understand the effects of a changing
military environment on aerospace medical technician training and the resultant level of
medical readiness.
Big Changes for the Armed Forces:
Since the inception of the United States Air Force as a separate service, there have
been wide fluctuations in both capital assets and personnel assigned to the Department of
Defense. Bases have closed and reactivated. The services have mobilized prior to and
demobilized following the various wars.

There have also been increases and decreases

in the number of personnel authorized. However, all of these changes pale in comparison
to the “right sizing” initiatives that began during the late 1980s and continue through
today. Perhaps the more recent reductions in force size prove more noticeable because
they followed quickly behind the Cold War expansion that marked the greatest build-up
of military power in the history of the United States (Brasher, 2000:5).
The Rise Before the Fall:
Under the Reagan administration, the United States military experienced extreme
growth in terms of personnel and materiel. The Reagan buildup, which took place from
1981-1987, “represented the most extensive and rapid peacetime enlargement of the
armed forces in American history” (Brasher, 2000:5). While personnel numbers
continued to climb through 1987, fiscal resources available to the Department of Defense
were beginning to decline with 1985 representing the apex of defense spending during
the post-Vietnam era. The year 1985 also represented a change in governmental fiscal
logic as Congress officially recognized the need to reduce federal spending through the
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passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-RudmanHollings). This act effectively sought to control government expenditures through the
end of the decade (Brasher, 2000:6).
Following the passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act, Congress and the Department of Defense began to search for alternative methods to
control spending. Unfortunately, both organizations came to the realization that reducing
personnel levels throughout the Department of Defense would yield the quickest and
most substantial savings for the defense budget (Betts, 1995:110). In light of this finding,
the Army and the Air Force began a modest downsizing effort in 1987. The Marine
Corps began a similar effort in 1988, while the Navy postponed personnel reductions
until 1990 (Brasher, 2000:1).
Although the draw down was rather modest and internally focused at first, a
number of world events combined with mounting fiscal constraints to expedite the
process. On December 7, 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev publicly announced
his intention to cut 500,000 Soviets from the armed forces by 1991 (Brasher, 2000:15).
On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, and on Mar 31, 1991, the Warsaw Pact
officially dissolved (Fisher, 1999:45). These events together with Gorbachev’s new
policies of perestroika (economic reform) and glasnost (political reform) seemed to
ensure the Soviet threat had diminished to nothing more than an interesting topic for
future history and political debates.
With the added security afforded by current events, the Department of Defense
proposed a 25% unilateral cut in uniformed personnel in 1990. Although Desert Storm
delayed the implementation of the proposed cuts, the subject of personnel cuts resurfaced
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as a primary feature of the Base Force Concept in 1991 (Powell, 1995:426, 431). Both
Congress and the DOD appeared convinced that work force reductions would provide a
safe and effective means for reducing the defense budget. As a result, extensive labor
reductions occurred during the 1990s.
The same logic that led to the draw-down of the 1990s lingers still today as
evidenced by the DOD’s announcement in January of 2005 of plans to cut an additional
16,600 Airmen by the end of fiscal 2005 (Grier, 2004:50). In April of 2005, the number
of proposed cuts had risen to 18,000, and by May, it had swollen to just under 24,000
troops. It is important to note that the USAF is already approximately 40% smaller than
it was during the Cold War. This being the case, the reductions planned for 2005 will
produce a significant impact on force readiness in view of the increasing operations
tempo confronting the USAF (Callander, 2004:50).
Changes in Infrastructure:
While work force reductions have significantly influenced the way the Air Force
trains and operates, the loss of land and materiel associated with five rounds of base
closures has also served as a significant force for change. The Base Closure and
Realignment Commission process began in 1988 following the assertion by former
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci that “the military could no longer support the
excessive military infrastructure and needed the potential savings for personnel and
equipment” (Schwalbe, 2003:1).
By 1988, Carlucci had witnessed a steady decline in Department of Defense
appropriated funds for three straight years (Principi, 2005:311). Both Congressional and
Department of Defense leaders felt that base closures were necessary in light of declining
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defense budgets. Many felt that maintaining the existing base structure was irresponsible
when considering the declining number of military personnel and the decreasing
availability of public funding (Crowe/Chanoff, 1993:328). Thus, it came as no surprise
when the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s decision affected 145
military installations with 86 bases selected for closure and 7 installations selected for
realignment. Congressional and Department of Defense planners projected these actions
would save close to $700 million per year (U.S. House of Representatives, Feb 22,
1989:38-39).
A second Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the closure
of 34 bases and the realignment of 48 others in 1991. This time Congressional and
Department of Defense planners projected an estimated net savings of $2.3 billion from
fiscal year 1992 to 1997. They also predicted a recurring savings of $1.5 billion annually
for 1998 and subsequent years. The 1991 Commission’s recommendations required an
initial one-time investment $4.1 billion, and represented a reduction of approximately 5.4
percent of the domestic base structure. Upon receiving the Commission’s report, the
President accepted its recommendations. Later, the House of Representatives rejected a
resolution of disapproval thereby ensuring the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure
Commission recommendations would be enforced as law (Principi, 2005:313).
In 1993, a third Base Closure and Realignment Commission was formed. The
1993 Commission recommended the closure of 130 bases and targeted an additional 45
bases for realignment. These proposed cuts represented a 6.2% reduction in military
infrastructure with an anticipated cost savings of $3.8 billion after five years and an
additional $2.3 billion savings realized every year after that (U.S. House of
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Representatives, 103rd Congress, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Report to the President, (D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 9.).
The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission proposed the closure of 28
installations and the realignment of an additional 104 bases. Legislators anticipated an
estimated cost savings of $1.6 billion per year as a result of the recommended reductions
(U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission Report to the President, (D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 1516).
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Initiative was far more extensive than
previous Base Realignment and Closure rounds with the number of recommendations in
2005 exceeding the number of recommendations in all four previous rounds combined.
In 2005, the Department of Defense submitted 837 distinct closure or realignment
recommendations. Of these recommendations, the Base Realignment and Closure
Commission approved 22 major base closures and 33 major realignments. When taking
minor closures and realignments into account, a total of 182 closures and realignments
are scheduled for implementation during the years following the 2005 Base Realignment
and Closure Commission (Principi, 2005: iii).
Base Closure and Realignment Impact on the Air Force:
Because the United States Air Force is a major component of the Department of
Defense, it did not escape the impact wrought by five Base Closure and Realignment
Commissions. In 1988, the Air Force felt the sting of the first Base Closure and
Realignment proceedings as five major Air Force installations were targeted for closure.
The bases effectively selected for closure were George Air Force Base, California;
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Mather Air Force Base, California; Norton Air Force Base, California; Chanute Air Force
Base, Illinois; and Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire. Fortunately, the realignment
process recommended by the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission did not
affect the Air Force (Edwards/Ribicoff, 1988: 74-79).
When the smoke had cleared from the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure
proceedings, it became clear that the Air Force had suffered the greatest loss of all the
military services. The commission recommended 13 major Air Force installations for
closure. The unfortunate bases selected for closure this time around included: Bergstrom
Air Force Base, Texas; Carswell Air Force Base, Texas; Castle Air Force Base,
California; Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas; England Air Force Base, Louisiana; Grissom
Air Force Base, Indiana; Loring Air Force Base, Maine; Lowry Air Force Base,
Colorado; Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina; Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve
Station, Montana; Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio; Williams Air Force Base, Arizona;
and Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan (Courter, 1991: 5-31—5-45).
The 1991 Commission also recommended military installations for realignment, and
this time, the Air Force was not quite as fortunate. Six major Air Force installations were
recommended for realignment: Beale Air Force Base, California; Goodfellow Air Force,
Texas; MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; March Air Force Base, California; Mather Air Force
Base, California; and Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. The 1988 Base Realignment
and Closure Commission had previously selected one of the Air Force bases selected for
realignment by the 1991 Commission (Mather Air Force Base, California) for closure. Thus,
Mather was permitted to remain open for a short while longer, but it was substantially
realigned (Courter, 1991: 5-31—5-45).
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The 1993 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended six major Air
Force installations for closure. Gentile Air Force Station, Ohio; Homestead Air Force Base,
Florida; K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan; Newark Air Force Base, Ohio; O’Hare
International Airport Air Reserve Station, Illinois; and Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York
all made the base closure list. Major Air Force facilities recommended for realignment
included Griffiss Air Force Base, New York; Hill Air Force Base, Utah; and March Air
Force Base, California (Courter, 1993: 1-71—1-83).
During the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) proceedings, six major Air

Force installations were approved for closure. The bases recommended for closure by the
1995 BRAC included: Mc Clellan Air Force Base, California; Ontario International
Airport Air Guard Station, California; Chicago O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve
Station, Illinois; Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York; Bergstrom Air Reserve Base,
Texas; and Reese Air Force Base, Texas all suffered the misfortune of making the base
closure list.

In addition to the aforementioned bases identified for closure, the 1995

Commission identified the following facilities for realignment: Onizuka Air Station,
California; Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana; Grand Forks Air
Force Base, North Dakota; Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; and Hill Air Force Base, Utah (Dixon,
1995: 1-83—1-113).
The 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission selected five major Air Force
installations for closure and twelve major Air Force installations for realignment. The bases
marked for closure include Kulis Air Guard Station, Alaska; Ozinuka Air Force Station,
California; Brooks City Base, Texas; General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, Wisconsin; and
Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. Installations targeted for realignment by the 2005
Commission included: Eielson AFB, Alaska; Elmendorf AFB, Alaska; Mountain Home
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AFB, Idaho; Pope AFB, North Carolina; Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota; Lackland
AFB, Texas; Sheppard AFB, Texas; McChord Air Force Base, Washington; Otis Air
National Guard Base, Maine; W.K. Kellogg Airport Guard Station, Michigan; Niagara
Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, New York; and Pittsburg International
Airport Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania (Principi, 2005: vi-vii).
Impact on Aerospace Medical Technician Training:
The loss of medical treatment facilities is perhaps the most discernable effect
experienced by the Air Force Medical Service following a major base closure, or in some
cases a major realignment. Many of the bases selected for closure operated fully staffed
hospitals. These facilities typically offered inpatient, outpatient, emergency, and in some
cases surgical services. When these hospitals closed in conjunction with base closures,
the Air Force lost important training grounds for future medical technicians, nurses, and
physicians. Unfortunately, the loss of capital assets only partially begins to describe the
effects of base closures (De Lorenzo, 2005: 825).
Another notable impact to technician training was realized through the loss of
experienced civilian personnel. Many hospitals throughout the Air Force have employed
civilian nurses and medical technicians in order to maintain a minimum level of
proficiency and experience. The civil servants employed by various medical treatment
facilities enabled meaningful knowledge transfer from highly experienced and highly
knowledgeable mentors to their less experienced military protégés. Because the civilian
workers were usually more experienced than their young military counterparts, they made
excellent trainers. Unfortunately, many of the civil servants employed in Air Force
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medical treatment facilities were forced to find work outside the Air Force following the
implementation of Base Closure and Realignment initiatives.
A Paradigm Shift from Inpatient to Outpatient Medicine:
Members of the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment Commission insisted that
the Department of Defense should confer with Congress to develop a plan outlining the
provision of health care to beneficiaries impacted by base closures (Courter, 1993: 2-4).
The 1991 Commission further mandated that the Department of Defense present a report
to Congress referencing Department of Defense and Congressional findings concerning
current health care policies within the Armed Services prior to the commencement of the
1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Many felt that the Department of
Defense failed to meet this requirement (Courter, 1993: 2-4).

Later, in 1993, the Department of Defense National Defense Authorization Act was
published. Section 722 of this Act required the Department of Defense to report on
alternative means to provide accessible health care in areas affected by base closures or
realignments (Courter, 1993:2-4). With the passage of this Act, Congress validated the
possibility that closing medical facilities may negatively impact the provision of quality
medical care to beneficiaries within the Department of Defense. Beneficiaries were hopeful
in the wake of this validation, with some even believing that previously lost facilities would
be reinstated.
The hopes of beneficiaries were soon dashed, however, during a brief deposition by
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs when he testified before the
1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. During his deposition, the Assistant
Secretary testified that military hospitals were operating at only one-half of normal in-patient
loads. He further proposed that the Armed Forces medical system possessed sufficient
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capacity to meet any readiness requirement as defined in Department of Defense Planning
Guidance (Courter, 1993: 2-4).” Members of the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment
Commission were somewhat taken aback by this revelation. They responded in turn by
suggesting that if medical treatment facilities were really operating this far below capacity,
the Department of Defense had both the “opportunity and responsibility to improve health
care operations and cost effectiveness (Courter, 1993: 2-4).”

In an effort to demonstrate their commitment to improved operations and health
care costs, the 1993 Commission provided guidance regarding future Department of
Defense improvement initiatives. In doing so, Committee members suggested that future
medical consolidation and cost reduction initiatives should focus on five major areas: (1)
Examining the consolidation of resources and specified geographic areas or regions across
military departments, (2) Closing medical treatment facilities operating at less than costeffective levels when considering the patient load and the cost of medical care in the
catchment area, (3) Moving assets across Military Departments and into other Service
facilities as necessary to increase the capability and usage of existing facilities and operating
beds, (4) Creating health care programs that operate on a competitive cost basis to support all
beneficiaries, (5) Upgrading substandard facilities that are still required (Courter, 1993: 2-4).
The Commission also recommended the Department of Defense should consider using
civilian sector resources whenever doing so proved cost effective.

Because the 1993 Commission focused so much attention on future medical
consolidation and restructuring, the Department of Defense created the Medical Joint
Cross-Service Group to assist 1995 Commissioners in ensuring the medical related
suggestions of the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission would actually be
implemented during the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment process. Further, the 1995
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Commission hoped that the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group would present additional
recommendations that “actively pursued military medical consolidation and
restructuring” (Dixon, 1995: 3-2).
When the Joint Cross Service Group presented its list of suggested actions to the
1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission, members of the Commission
recognized the Group’s suggestions offered “a good first step towards restructuring the
military medical system (Dixon, 1995: 3-2).” However, most of the Group’s suggestions
were not presented as closure or realignment recommendations. In an effort to partially
compensate for this oversight, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
assured the 1995 Commission they would pursue some of the 1995 Medical Joint CrossService Group’s suggestions outside of Base Closure and Realignment channels (Dixon,
1995: 3-3). The Commission also received assurances from senior Department of
Defense officials and independent service branch representatives that they would work
together to earnestly pursue further consolidation and integration of military medical
facilities. Service branch representatives worked hard to convince Commissioners they
would implement future restructuring activities across service lines. The 1995 Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission was encouraged by the level of intra-service
cooperation demonstrated by the service branches, and reiterated that the service
branches should continue to work together in this important effort (Dixon, 1995: 3-2).
While Commissioners from the 1995 Commission were pleased to see progress
with respect to restructuring the provision of medical care, they were careful to point out
that observed progress was minimal. Commissioners advocated much deeper reductions
in direct care capacity across the Department of Defense, and for the first time
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Commissioners suggested the bulk of these reductions should occur in the inpatient care
arena (Dixon, 1995: 3-3). The Commission was convinced that reductions in inpatient
care capacity would save money and improve the efficiency of the military medical
system.
The Department of Defense began to recognize that increasing budget constraints
would prevent the continued operation of its numerous military medical treatment
facilities even before the 1995 Commission convened. One of the major concerns for
Department of Defense planners involved the continued medical readiness for assigned
personnel. Comments found in the preliminary draft of the Department of Defense
Medical Readiness Strategic Plan emphasized Department of Defense frustrations
regarding the lack of focus on medical readiness sustainment training. For example, the
author’s of the plan stated, “In retrospect, the focus during peacetime emphasized
healthcare delivery…often at the expense of medical readiness (Anonymous, 1994: 37).”
About the same time the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission
presented its final report to the President (July, 1995), the Congressional Budget Office
released a substantial report entitled, Restructuring Military Health Care. This report
indicated that the Department of Defense Medical Budget was growing at an alarming
rate. Specifically, the report indicated that the Department of Defense medical budget
increased by over 65% during the period spanning 1979 and 1995 ( Davidson, 1995: xii).
Further, the report suggested the Department of Defense could not justify retaining the
current military health delivery system unless two major conditions were met. The first
of these conditions mandated “the provision of peacetime care must contribute to the
Department of Defense’s ability to perform its wartime mission (Davidson, 1995: 4).”
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The second condition required that “the Department should be able to provide peace-time
healthcare cost effectively” (Davidson, 1995: 4).
In order to demonstrate inherent inefficiencies with respect to the Department of
Defense’s attempt to use peacetime care to ensure wartime readiness, the Congressional
Budget Office conducted a study of over 1,000,000 medical records. The study
demonstrated a disconnect between peacetime medical operations and wartime medical
operations. In conducting the study, the Congressional Budget Office compared specific
medical conditions observed during peacetime operations at military medical treatment
facilities to a list of typical medical conditions expected to occur during wartime. The list
of expected wartime medical conditions used for the study was developed by the Naval
Health Research Center. Not surprisingly, the study revealed some major differences
between peacetime and wartime diagnoses (Davidson, 1995: 6-8).
For the purpose of the study, the wartime medical conditions were divided into
two major categories: disease and non-battle injuries were placed in the first category,
while wounded in action diagnoses were placed in the second group. There was a 75%
correlation between the first category and conditions treated at military medical centers
during peacetime (Davidson, 1995: 7). Sadly, there was only a 5% correlation between
the second category and peacetime military medical care (Davidson, 1995: 8).
While the Congressional Budget Office study did reveal disparity between
primary diagnoses rendered during peacetime and war, it failed to consider similarities in
treatment measures for different diagnoses. For example, although a traumatic
amputation and viral syndrome are worlds apart in terms of diagnoses, both conditions
potentially require fluid replacement therapy, thereby presenting medical personnel with
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the opportunity to practice intravenous catheter insertion techniques and the preparation
of intravenous infusion equipment.
The failure of the 1995 Congressional Budget Office study to recognize training
opportunities inherent to multiple diagnoses was a tragic oversight. The study was not
refuted, and it was often cited as partial justification for the closure or realignment of
medical treatment facilities across the Department of Defense.
While the Congressional Budget Office study seemed to advocate the closure and
realignment of military medical facilities, as well as increased dependence on civilian
programs, the report seemed to contradict itself by voicing concerns regarding the impact
proposed reductions would have on medical training throughout the Department of
Defense. On one hand, the report suggested that peacetime medical operations
throughout the Department of Defense were not sufficient to maintain adequate medical
readiness. On the other hand the report stated, “Any reduction in the size of the military
establishment would have a major impact on training and preparation for wartime”
(Davidson, 1995: 2).
In an environment of increasing budget constraints, the 2005 Base Closure and
Realignment Commission seemed more determined than ever to reduce existing military
infrastructure. The Commission’s commitment to cut costs wherever possible placed
additional pressure on the 2005 Medical Joint Cross Service Group. Thus, the 2005
Medical Joint Cross Service Group worked diligently to identify areas for realignment or
closure within the Department of Defense’s medical community. The 2005 Group also
embodied the modern concept of “jointness” by suggesting numerous mergers and
realignments across service branch lines (Taylor, 2005).
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While the 2005 Medical Joint Cross Service Group (“Group” hereafter) proved
highly committed to reducing operating budgets and infrastructure throughout the
Department of Defense’s medical treatment facilities, the Group also voiced concern
regarding the impact of closures and realignment on medical training. The Group hoped
to avoid the closure of facilities that offered unique capabilities as evidenced by their
statement: “Closure of any activity that provides a unique capability in support of a
particular element of the medical/dental education and training mission, or that provides
unique capabilities in support of that mission, will have an immediate impact on the
ability of the Department of Defense to continue to meet the full spectrum of mission
requirements (Taylor, 2005: 7). Further, the Group warned of the potential consequences
related to closing or realigning any medical activities without prior planning, stating:
“Closures of activities that are not unique in their missions or capabilities may reduce the
Department of Defense’s capacity to train personnel without careful prior planning and
realignment (Taylor, 2005: 7).”
The recommendations of the 2005 Group were much more substantial than the
recommendations of the 1995 Group. The recommendations of the 2005 Medical Joint
Cross Service Group included: the closure of 9 inpatient functions, the conversion of
multiple hospitals to outpatient clinics, and the consolidation of medical training
platforms across the services. Even the Air Force’s premier hospital, Wilford Hall
Medical Center, was not spared from the Group’s recommendations. The 2005 Group
suggested the former 1500 inpatient bed facility should be converted into an ambulatory
(outpatient) care center (Taylor, 2005: 31-32).
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The recommendations of 2005 Medical Joint Cross Service Group will
undoubtedly result in the closure of additional Emergency Service Departments and
Inpatient Units across the United States Air Force. With the closure of these facilities,
even fewer technicians will experience the opportunity to gain valuable knowledge only
offered through hands-on experience in the inpatient and emergency service arenas. As
recently as 9 May 2005, the 2005 Group sealed the fate of additional inpatient units and
emergency service departments across the Air Force through closure and realignment
initiatives. The recommendations of the Medical Joint-Cross Service Group were
included in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Report presented to the Secretary of
Defense.
When considered in sum, past and present closure and realignment initiatives
effected by the various Base Closure and Realignment Commissions have significantly
impacted all facets of Department of Defense medical skills sustainment training.
Unfortunately, the effects of significantly reducing personnel exposure to inpatient and
emergency medicine will be felt for some time to come. While all medical personnel will
experience consequences resultant to closure and realignment initiatives, it is, perhaps,
the enlisted force that will suffer the greatest loss. Because commissioned medical
officers typically possess certifications and licensures recognized by civilian institutions,
they are able to receive training through civilian training programs. This proves
problematic for enlisted medical personnel, however, as they typically possess skill sets
for which there is no civilian equivalent. For example, as an enlisted medic, I have been
trained and certified in advanced suture techniques, medication administration, fluid
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replacement therapy, and hemodynamic monitoring, but liability issues related to
licensure would prevent me from practicing these skills in many civilian institutions.
The 2005 Medical Joint Cross Service Group hopes to regain lost training
opportunities for enlisted medics by establishing a single “Enlisted Medical Training
Center of Excellence” for enlisted medical personnel at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The
center will provide basic and advanced medical training for all enlisted medical career
fields in all service departments. The only exceptions will be enlisted courses offered at
the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine. Aerospace Medicine technicians will attend
courses offered through this school at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (Taylor,
2005: 26).
These large facilities will undoubtedly provide an exceptional initial training
environment for enlisted personnel, however, at present, the Enlisted Medical Training
Centers of Excellence are not targeted for the provision of skills sustainment training.
Even if enlisted technicians could return to these centers for skills sustainment training,
any attempt to ensure the continued medical readiness of the entire enlisted medical force
through the “Centers of Excellence” would probably be cost prohibitive in terms of travel
pay, per diem, and time lost at work.
In consideration of continued changes within the enlisted medical community, it
is imperative that the Department of Defense and its associated medical communities
seek out new training methods capable of improving current levels of medical readiness.
Alternative training techniques must be developed and implemented if the Air Force
medical service hopes to ensure the continued medical readiness of its aerospace medical
technicians. This will prove rather difficult, however, as future efforts training initiatives
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must overcome limitations in the present training environment and restrictions resultant
to increasing budgetary constraints.
Chapter Summary:
This chapter began with a brief history of Aerospace Medical Technician
Training. Next, the chapter described personnel and infrastructural changes within the
Air Force. Then, the chapter discussed the impact of the base closure and realignment
process on the Air Force, the medical service, and aerospace medical technician training.
Finally, the chapter explored the Air Force paradigm shift from inpatient and emergency
medicine to outpatient and preventative medicine. The thesis now progresses to Chapter
3 to describe the methodology used to complete the research effort in detail.
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III. Methodology

Chapter Overview:
This chapter provides an in-depth explanation of the research methods used to
explore the present and future state of Aerospace Medical Technician sustainment
training during an era of rapid change. More specifically, the chapter explains qualitative
and quantitative data collection methods engaged by the study and provides a review of
qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques used to derive answers to the
research questions proposed in Chapter 1.
Exploring Approaches to Research:
As noted during the literature review, many of the changes observed in the
Aerospace Medical Technician training environment resulted from numerous base
closure and realignment initiatives. Because the base closure and realignment issue and
the state of Aerospace Medical Technician readiness are issues of significant scope,
multiple research methods were engaged in an attempt to facilitate improved
understanding of the problem under study. The individual research methods applied
include: historical analysis, case study research, and statistical interpretation of survey
data. This being the case, the thesis utilized both qualitative and quantitative research
techniques, resulting in a mixed methods approach to research.
While multiple research methods were used, the objectives of this research
seemed to suggest a revelatory, embedded single case approach for the overarching
methodology. The case study methodology was selected in part because this thesis effort
is based on research questions formulated to develop a deeper understanding of a
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particular phenomenon as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (Leedy, et al, 2001: 100).
The revelatory, single case design was selected because the researcher “has access to a
situation previously inaccessible to scientific observation” as suggested by Yin (Yin,
2003: 42). The following paragraphs will provide additional insight regarding the
research framework constructed for this research effort.
A Brief Review of Available Research Frameworks:
Typically, research is considered to be quantitative or qualitative in nature.
However, more recently, a number of studies have combined qualitative and quantitative
techniques to form a “mixed methods” approach (Creswell, 2003: 208). Because this
research effort has opted to employ a mixed methods framework, a brief review of each
research methodology is provided.
Quantitative Research:
Quantitative research is typically used to answer questions like: How much?
How many? How often? The results of quantitative research are usually presented as
numbers, percentages, or rates (Bouma, 2000: 19). Additionally, quantitative research is
generally used when the researcher desires to explore the relationship observed between
measured variables in an attempt to explain, predict, or control phenomena. However,
quantitative research is also often used to prove or disprove a hypothesis (or hypotheses)
generated through current or previous research (Leedy, et al, 2001: 100-103).
Qualitative Research:
Qualitative research is somewhat different in that it attempts to answer questions
regarding the complexity of research worthy phenomena by leveraging the researcher’s
point of view as a tool to facilitate deeper comprehension concerning the phenomena
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under study (Schwab, 2005: 7). Qualitative research attempts to answer questions like:
“What is it like to be a member of that group?” “What is going on in this situation?”
“What is it like to experience that phenomenon?” Thus, qualitative research is typically
expressed through images, feelings, and impressions (Bouma, 2000: 20). The qualitative
research approach attempts to describe the “qualities of the events under study (Bouma,
2000: 20).”
Another distinguishing factor of qualitative research is observed in that qualitative
research often generates new hypotheses or tentative answers to research problems. It is
often said that qualitative research can be used to build new theory. However, qualitative
researchers also use procedures derived from the humanities and social sciences to better
understand and describe current or historical events (Leedy, et al, 2001) (Schwab, 2005:
7). Typically, qualitative research proves most beneficial when attempting to study
complex problems within their natural setting (Leedy, et al, 2001).
The Mixed Methods Approach to Research:
The mixed methods approach to research provides a means for collecting and
analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or in a series of studies.
This modern approach to research is typically based on the priority and sequence of
information (Creswell, 2003: 208). While the mixed method approach combines both
qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques, it also allows for quantitative and
qualitative interpretation of results (Creswell, 2003: 208). According to Cresswell, 2003,
a mixed method approach to research generally bases knowledge claims on pragmatic
grounds.
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In further explanation, Creswell suggests that the mixed methods approach to
research tends to be consequence oriented, problem centered, and pluralistic (Creswell,
2003: 18). Additionally, because mixed methods research is viewed as a more pragmatic
approach to research, this style of research may address needs and results in lieu of cause
and effects (Berube, 2001: 867). Because the problem under investigation addresses the
need for a new training model, the mixed methods approach appears to be the logical
choice for the current research effort.
Choosing the Appropriate Research Framework:
In attempting to select an appropriate research methodology, Leedy and Ormrod’s
“rationale for selecting an appropriate research methodology” was applied as described in
the table below. The Leedy and Ormrod rationale is based on five general questions
(Table 1) developed to assist the researcher in determining whether a qualitative or
quantitative research approach should be implemented (Leedy et. al, 2001). An in-depth
explanation of these questions follows the table. See Table 1 for additional information.
Table 1: Rationale for Selecting the Appropriate Research Methodology:
Question:
What is the purpose of the research?

What is the nature of the research process?

What are the methods of data collection?
What is the form of reasoning used in
analysis?
How are findings communicated?

Quantitative:
• To explain and predict
• To confirm and validate
• To test theory
• Focused
• Known variables
• Established guidelines
• Static design
• Context-free
• Detached view
• Representative, large sample
• Standardized instruments
• Deductive analysis

Qualitative:
• To describe and explain
• To explore and interpret
• To build theory
• Holistic
• Unknown variables
• Flexible guidelines
• Emergent design
• Context-bound
• Personal view
• Informative, small sample
• Observations, interviews
• Inductive analysis

• Numbers
• Statistics, aggregated data
• Formal voice, scientific style

• Words
• Narratives, individual quotes
• Personal voice, literary style

(adapted from Leedy and Ormrod, 2001)
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Question 1: What is the purpose of the research?
To facilitate appropriate research methodology selection, the first question posed
by Leedy and Ormrod references the purpose of the research. The question of purpose
proves to be somewhat ambiguous as it is not generally as facile as one might hope.
Thus, the question of purpose is more easily answered when it is divided into its minor
sub-questions. These sub-questions include:
1. Is the research intended to explain and predict or to describe and explain?
2. Is the research intended to confirm and validate or to explore and interpret?
3. Does the research attempt to test theory or to build theory?
While, quantitative researchers attempt to explain observations or predict future
events by testing existing or proposed theory, the qualitative researcher resolves to build
theory through exploration and interpretation of available data. This research attempts to
explore a complex problem in its natural setting through a somewhat ethnographically
focused analysis of historical events that have substantially changed the Aerospace
Medicine training environment and Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment
training. Further, because this research attempts to propose an alternative model for
training, the study can reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to build theory. Finally,
the research questions proposed in Chapter 1 were exploratory questions posed in an
effort to interpret events that impacted Aerospace Medical Technician training. Each of
these observations suggests the current study lends itself to a qualitative approach.
Question 2: What is the nature of the research process?
Leedy and Ormrod’s second question addresses the nature of the research process.
This question also contains a number of sub-questions, such as:
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1.

Is the research focused or holistic?

2.

Are the research variables known or unknown?

3.

Are research guidelines established and rigid, or are they flexible?

4.

Is the research design static or emergent?

5.

Is the research process context free or context bound?

6.

Does the research process employ a detached view or a personal view?

Because this research effort attempts to address events from beginning to end
during a specific historical era, it must be considered holistic in nature. The research
variables were not known prior to the research, and the research design was emergent in
nature. Further, the research process is somewhat context bound as this research applies
specifically to a single enlisted career field within the United States Air Force. Again,
the answers to these questions overwhelmingly suggested a qualitative approach.
Further, it was pointed out by Leedy and Ormrod that the most important criteria
in this group of sub-questions concerned the detached versus personal view perspective
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Because this research involves subjective interpretation of
qualitative and quantitative data, the personal view was preeminent over a detached view,
again suggesting a qualitative research design.
Question 3: What are the methods of data Collection?
The third question posed by Leedy and Ormrod concerns data collection methods.
While quantitative studies typically examine large representative samples of the relevant
population, qualitative studies generally examine informative, smaller samples. Further,
quantitative studies usually involve formal standardized instruments, while qualitative
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studies tend to rely upon observations and interviews with the researcher sometimes
referred to as the research instrument (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
Since the survey portion of this research was administered to the entire population
of Air Force Aerospace Medical Technicians (Griffin-Hamilton, 2005), the sample size
was rather large with over 5,000 technicians taking part in the survey. According to
Leedy and Ormrod, such a large sample size seems to suggest a quantitative approach for
this portion of the study.
Additional support suggesting the survey portion of the study is quantitative in
nature is observed in the fact that a standardized instrument developed by the Air Force
Occupational Measurement Squadron was administered to collect survey data (GriffinHamilton, 2005). It should be noted, however, that survey participants in this study
represented an embedded unit of analysis. Thus, while the survey data collected and
statistical tests performed are representative components of quantitative techniques, they
will be presented as support for a single-case (Yin, 2001: 91).
Question 4: What is the form of reasoning used in analysis?
The fourth question considered focuses on the form of reasoning or logic used in
conducting the research. Unlike Leedy and Ormrod’s former questions, this question
contained no sub-questions, and it provided only two alternatives to choose from,
deductive analysis and inductive analysis. In order to facilitate an informed decision
regarding which type of reasoning will be applied for this study, both forms of reasoning
were addressed independently.
In formal deductive reasoning “a conclusion follows necessarily from a stated
premise (Berube, 2001: 295).” This involves an inference made by “reasoning from the
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general to the specific (Berube, 2001: 295).” Deductive reasoning is usually observed in
quantitative research. This makes sense because quantitative studies typically commence
from general theories or hypotheses to specific conclusions based on logic supported by
quantitative data analysis techniques.
Inductive reasoning involves drawing general inferences, conclusions, or
principles from specific instances or facts (reasoning from specific to general). With
inductive reasoning, the conclusions reached are probable, reasonable, plausible, and
believable because the truth of the premises makes likely the truth of conclusion. Thus, a
limitation of inductive reasoning is recognized in that while the conclusion is probable, it
may also be fallible (Hardegree, 1999: 5).
Inductive reasoning is typically observed in qualitative studies. In performing a
qualitative study, the researcher makes specific observations while collecting data. The
researcher then uses these observations to formulate a general inference through
inductive reasoning techniques (Berube, 2001: 565).
After reviewing the dichotomous forms of reasoning presented by Leedy and
Ormrod, it becomes apparent that the reasoning framework for this study suggests a
qualitative approach. In performing the study, specific facts and observations will be
used to demonstrate the general need for a new Aerospace Medical Technician skills
sustainment training model. Hence, the logic applied to the research is inductive in
nature, because it progresses from specific premises to a general conclusion. Therefore,
the reasoning employed for this research effort must be viewed as qualitative.
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Question 5: How are findings communicated?
Leedy and Ormrod’s final question explores how the researcher will communicate
his or her research results. Because this research effort incorporates narratives and
individual quotes as well as statistics and aggregated survey data, both qualitative and
quantitative communication techniques are key features of the communication process
engaged for the study (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Thus, elements of the study that deal
with communicating results to the audience suggest a mixed methods approach.
The Overarching Framework:
Through answering the five questions that shape Leedy and Ormrod’s rationale
for choosing an appropriate research methodology, it becomes apparent that a mixed
methods research approach is most suitable for this thesis effort. The decision to include
both qualitative an quantitative methods of data collection and data analysis is well
supported in the literature. Yin (2003: 93) and Leedy et al (2001) suggest that research
studies are enhanced through the convergence of qualitative and quantitative research
practices. However, because most of the research framing questions posed by Leedy and
Ormrod led to qualitative responses, the overarching framework for the research is
qualitative in nature. Thus, the final framework for the research is determined to be
qualitative with quantitative support.
Yin (2003) discussed exemplary single-case studies that were strengthened by
quantitative survey data and quantitative statistical tests (Yin, 2003: 91). Thus, the
decision to employ a mixed methods approach in support of a qualitative research
framework was reached in good conscience through the application of established means.
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Summary of Leedy and Ormrod’s Rationale for Research Methodology Selection:
1. Purpose of the research: Qualitative
2. Nature of the research project: Qualitative
3. Data Collection Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative
4. Form of Reasoning: Qualitative (Inductive Analysis)
5. Communication Methods for Results: Qualitative and Quantitative
Research Design:
After determining that an overarching qualitative framework was sufficient for the
current study, additional elements of research design were considered. Elliot (2005),
Cresswell (2003), Neuendorf (2002), Bouma (2000), and Glaser (1994) proposed a
number of qualitative research designs. The major designs described by these
researchers included: grounded theory, narrative research, phenomenological research,
ethnographies, content analysis, and case study. Because each of these designs can stand
alone as an individual research strategy, a brief review of each methodology is warranted.
Grounded Theory:
Grounded theory is a nascent but growing research design focused toward theory
building (Glaser, 92; Dick, 2002). The grounded theory approach to research is quite
unconventional because, unlike other research designs, it doesn’t begin with constructs.
The grounded theory research design begins with a situation (Glaser, 92). Further,
grounded theory research is explicitly emergent in nature and does not involve hypothesis
testing. It is uniquely suited for building theory, focusing on the creation of a theory that
will actually account for the research situation as it exists. The chief objective of
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grounded theory as stated by Glaser is to “discover the theory implicit in the data”
(Glaser, 1994: 2).
While the current research effort begins with a situation, and involves theory
building, other critical components of the grounded theory approach were not used for
this research. For example, Cresswell (2003) suggested the two primary characteristics
of the grounded theory approach were “the constant comparison of data with emerging
categories and theoretical sampling of different groups to maximize the similarities and
the differences of information. (Cresswell, 2003: 14).” Because this research only
involved a single sampling, of a single group, the grounded theory research design was
not appropriate.
Narrative Research:
Hinchman and Hinchman (1997) defined narratives as “discourses with a clear
sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus
offer insights about the world and/or people’s experience of it” (Hinchman and
Hinchman, 1997: xvi). Elliot (2005) stressed three key features of narrative research:
(1.) A temporal or chronological dimension is used to describe a series of events or
experiences rather than an existing state of affairs. (2.) The meaning of events or
experiences is communicated through evaluative statements and the temporal
configuration of events. (3.) The narrative must demonstrate an important social
dimension (Elliot, 2005: 15). Cresswell (2003) added that narrative researchers typically
ask one or more individuals to provide stories about their lives or the series of events
being studied (Cresswell, 2003: 15). Because this research attempts to explore an
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existing state of affairs and there is no application of storytelling, narrative research was
not appropriate for the current study.
Phenomenological Research:
Phenomenological research involves a researcher’s attempt to capture the
“essence” of human experiences concerning a phenomenon through descriptions
provided by research participants. Bouma (2000) added that phenomenological research
“focuses on the ways in which social actors make situations meaningful (Bouma, 2000:
180). Generally, phenomenological research involves a small sample and requires
prolonged and extensive observation. Observation is typically directed toward
developing patterns and relationships of meaning (Creswell, 2003: 15). Because the
current research does not involve prolonged observation and social actors will not be
emphasized, the phenomenological research model was inappropriate for this study.
Ethnography:
Bouma (2000) described ethnography as a longitudinal study that attempts to
describe the “way of life” of a group, culture, or subculture (Bouma, 2000: 180). Similar
to phenomenological research, ethnographic research requires prolonged observation and
it focuses on determining the meaning of social action and social organization. This form
of research may also include the description of basic structures observed in the group or
society being studied (Bouma, 2000: 180). While Aerospace Medical Technicians taken
together as a group meet the criteria for consideration as a unique subculture, specific
elements of data collection and data analysis were not longitudinal in nature. Therefore,
the ethnographic research framework is not entirely appropriate for the current study.
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Content Analysis:
In performing a content analysis, the researcher develops a measuring instrument
or checklist and basically counts how frequently ideas, words, phrases, images, or scenes
appear (Bouma, 2000: 80). Bouma (2000) simply defined content analysis as “a different
way to examine records, documents or publications (Bouma, 2000: 80). Neuendorf
(2002) provided a more robust definition, suggesting content analysis is “the systematic,
objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 2002: 1).
Further, Neuendorf seemed adamant in her assertion that content analysis is inherently
quantitative.
Mayring (2000) suggested qualitative content analysis must be regarded as a
feasible and valid research methodology. He defines qualitative content analysis as “an
approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of
communication, following content analytical rules and step-by-step models, without rash
quantification (Mayring, 2000: 2). Patton (2002) also indicated that content analysis
should be considered qualitative in nature when he asserted “the ideal-typical qualitative
strategy is made up of three parts: (1) qualitative data, (2) a holistic-inductive design of
naturalistic inquiry, and (3) content or case analysis” (Patton, 2002: 248).
While some controversy exists regarding whether content analysis should be
considered qualitative or quantitative in nature, for the purpose of this study, content
analysis is viewed as a qualitative technique, because it is applied to qualitative data.
Thus, while the results of the analysis are quantitative in nature, the “Medical Lessons
Learned” from which the results were derived are incontrovertibly qualitative in nature.
In essence, while quantitative counts are tallied, these counts are representative of
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instances of qualitative data. For these reasons, the content analysis performed is
considered qualitative in nature. Furthermore, content analysis does not serve as the
primary research design. It merely serves to provide proof and clarification support for
the qualitative, revelatory, embedded, single case design used for this thesis effort.
Case Study Research:
The case study is perhaps one of the most popular qualitative research designs,
and it seems well-suited for the current research effort (Cresswell, 2003: 15). Case
studies tend to focus on the “individual(s), program(s), or event(s) on which the
investigation is focused” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 149). Further, Yin suggests that case
studies represent “empirical inquiries that investigate contemporary phenomena within
their real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the
context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003: 13). Because this research attempts to
investigate the current state of Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment training,
the case study methodology seems entirely appropriate.
Rationale for Choosing Case Study Research:
In addition to Yin’s comments above, Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich, (2002)
described three additional strengths inherent to case study research. These strengths
included:
(1)

The phenomenon can be studied in its natural setting and meaningful,
relevant theory generated from the understanding gained through observing
actual practice.
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(2)

The case method allows the questions of why, what and how, to be
answered with a relatively full understanding of the nature and complexity
of the complete phenomenon.

(3)

The case method lends itself to early, exploratory investigations where the
variables are still unknown and the phenomenon not at all understood.
(Voss, Tsikriktis, and Frohlich, 2002: 197)

The first strength offered by Voss, Tsikriktis, and Frohlick is desirable for the
current study as it involves an attempt to understand the nature of Aerospace Medical
Technician skills sustainment training as currently provided in the real world. The
second strength is desirable because this thesis poses exploratory questions to facilitate a
deeper understanding regarding past and present events that work together to shape
Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment training. The third strength is also
necessary as the variables affecting Aerospace Medical Technician training are still
somewhat unknown and declining levels of medical readiness are not fully understood.
This final point is also in agreement with Leedy’s assertion that the case study research is
“…especially suitable for learning more about a little known or poorly understood
situation” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 149).
Final Research Design:
In selecting a research design, the researcher establishes a plan that details what
data to gather, how the data will be gathered, from whom data will be gathered, when the
data will be collected, and how the data will be analyzed once it is obtained. A well
established research design enables the researcher to more appropriately explore the
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research questions by providing guidelines the researcher should follow in his or her
attempt to answer research questions (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
An Overarching Case Study:
Yin (2003) suggested that a single case study design is appropriate in a number of
situations. A single case design may be appropriate when: the researcher desires to
explain or explore a single instance of a unique phenomenon, the case under study is
representative of commonplace events, a particular phenomenon was previously
inaccessible to researchers, and when a longitudinal study seems logical (Yin, 2003: 4042). On the other hand, a multiple case design should be implemented if the possibility
exists for replication between cases, or if there is a potential to demonstrate contrast
between cases (Yin, 2003: 53-54).
A single case design was chosen for this study because it meets the criteria
established for a revelatory case. According to Yin (2003), a case is considered
revelatory in nature when “an investigator has opportunity to analyze a phenomenon
previously inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin, 2003: 42). The phenomenon
investigated in this study concerns Aerospace Medical Technician readiness during the
turbulent era of base closures and realignments. The researcher’s experience with
multiple closures and realignments coupled with extreme longevity in Aerospace Medical
Technician career field provide unique insights with respect to Aerospace Medial
Technician skills sustainment training. The study is also the first of its kind as no other
studies regarding Aerospace Medical technician sustainment training were available in
the public available literature arena.

-51-

The embedded case study design was selected because the research effort will
involve more than one unit of analysis. While the single case for this study is represented
by a phenomenon as described above, attention will also be directed toward subunits
within the phenomenon. For example, during the survey section of the study, individual
Aerospace Medical Technicians were used as the unit of analysis. Further, during the
content analysis section of the study individual lessons learned represented an additional
unit of analysis (Yin, 2003: 42-43).
A structured review of the literature has revealed that an embedded, single case
study design is well suited for this research project. Further, it has been determined that a
double application of the sequential exploratory design as described by Cresswell (2003)
will be completed (Cresswell, 2003: 213). Refer to the model provided below.

Figure 1: Sequential Exploratory Design
(Adapted from Cresswell, 2003)
In adhering to the double application of Yin’s Sequential Exploratory design, the
research will begin with a qualitative description of the current Aerospace Medical
Technician skills sustainment training model. Next, quantitative historical data will be
reviewed to demonstrate recent changes experienced in the Aerospace Medical
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Technician training environment. Following this review, qualitative content analysis will
be performed on Air Force Lessons Learned. Finally, secondary survey data will be
analyzed in an attempt to demonstrate a statistically significant difference between the
deployed training environment and the training environment provided at home station.
As previously stated, these steps will result in a double sequential exploratory design.
The double sequential exploratory design will form the foundation for the exploratory,
embedded, single case study. Because the qualitative nature of the study is emphasized,
qualitative evidence will take priority (it will be presented first) as described by Creswell
(Creswell, 2003: 213).
The Nature of the Study:
As previously stated, it was determined that an exploratory study is warranted.
According Yin (2003), “what” questions are appropriate for exploratory studies (Yin,
2003: 6). When appropriately applied, “what” questions assist the researcher in exploring
the phenomenon under study with the hope of establishing hypotheses or propositions for
further study. This research project is well suited for the exploratory model as it was
initiated to draw attention to a general problem with the hope that future research will be
devoted to further attempts toward problem resolution. A second driver for the study
concerned the lack of a formalized training model for Aerospace Medical Technician
skills sustainment training. The research was conducted with two general purposes: (1.)
explore the drivers that necessitate a new aerospace medical technician skills sustainment
training model, and (2.) exploring potential model development. In both respects, the
study is exploratory in nature.
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Case Study Components:
Because an embedded, single case design was selected as the overarching
framework for this study, additional information concerning case study design is in order.
According to Yin (2003) there are five major components of research design essential to
performing a case study. These components include: the study’s questions; its
propositions; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the propositions; and
criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003: 21). Each of these five components are
discussed in more detail below.
The Study’s Questions:
Chapter 1 introduced the research questions for this thesis effort. The research
questions serve as a guide in performing research. The following research questions were
presented in Chapter 1:
Research Questions:
Research Question 1:
What is the present model used to provide Air Force Aerospace Medical
Technician skills sustainment training?
Research Question 2:
Have there been recent changes to the aerospace medical skills sustainment
training environment that may contribute to the success or failure of the current model?
Research Question 3:
What indicators might suggest the current model has not successfully ensured
medical readiness for Aerospace Medical Technicians?

-54-

Research Question 4:
Is a new Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment training model
warranted?
To further explore the research questions, the following investigative questions
were proposed:
Investigative Questions:
Investigative Question for Research Question 1:
What evidence suggests a formal model for aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training?
Investigative Question for Research Question 2:
What changes have occurred with respect to land, labor, capital, and the nature of
work?
Investigative Question for Research Question 3:
What insights can be gained from Air Force Lessons Learned with respect to
Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment training?
Investigative Question for Research Question 4:
What are some of the existing problem areas the new model should address?
Study Proposition:
The current research effort explores the proposition that numerous elements of the
Aerospace Medical Technician training environment have changed. If this is, indeed, the
case, then the methodology and model employed to conduct skills sustainment training
for Aerospace Medical Technicians should also change. Such change is necessary in
order to minimize the effects of limited resources realized in a training environment
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plagued by right sizing and base closures. Further, any future training model must prove
robust against further base closure and realignment initiatives and increased outsourcing.
Thus, the seminal proposition addressed by this research effort becomes: What must
change with respect to current medical skills sustainment training if we hope to maintain
a high degree of medical readiness for present and future Aerospace Medical
Technicians?
Logic Linking Data to Proposition:
The fourth essential component of case study research advocated by Yin (2003)
states that data must be linked to propositions (Yin, 2003: 26). For the purpose of this
study, data will be linked to the single proposition through inductive logic. Links will be
formed through historical analysis, content analysis, and quantitative survey techniques.
Yin (2003) suggested that “pattern-matching” is one of the most powerful linking
mechanisms used in case study research. When performing “pattern-matching,” the
researcher attempts ascertain if “several pieces of information…may be related to some
theoretical proposition” (Yin, 2003:26). Further, Leedy and Ormrod have found that
pattern matching assists the researcher in determining if underlying themes are
characterizations of the broader case (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
While this study does not take full advantage of pattern-matching, content
analysis (which in many respects is a specialized form of pattern-matching) is used.
Content analysis proves extremely valuable in linking data to propositions. In this
particular research effort, the researcher observed “Air Force Lessons Learned” for
patterns suggestive of applicability with respect to aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training issues. This comparison, while performed under content analysis,
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probably satisfies the intent of pattern matching as described by Leedy and Ormrod
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
In summary, data will be linked to propositions qualitatively through inductive
logic strategies that include historical analysis of archival records and qualitative content
analysis of Air Force Lessons Learned. Additionally, the qualitative chain of evidence
linking data to propositions will be strengthened through the addition of quantitative
evidence derived from statistical analysis of Aerospace Medical Technician survey data
provided by the Air Force Occupational Measurement Squadron (Griffin-Hamilton,
2005).
Criteria for Interpreting Findings:
Yin (2003) advocated effective criteria for interpreting the findings as his fifth
essential component of case study research (Yin, 2003: 21). Patton (2002) proved
insightful in his observation that traditional quantitative evaluation criteria for a study’s
findings focuses on the elements of rigor, validity, reliability, and generalizability
(Patton, 2002: 13). Patton further suggests, however, that qualitative studies can not be
held to the same evaluation criteria used for quantitative studies, because quantitative
study evaluation criteria is highly instrument focused, and the researcher typically serves
as the evaluation instrument for qualitative studies (Patton, 2002: 14).
In light of this observation, Patton suggests that nontraditional criteria for
interpreting the study’s findings should be employed for qualitative research. According
to Patton, such nontraditional criteria should focus on elements of trustworthiness,
diversity of perspectives, clarity of voice, and the credibility of the researcher (Patton,
2002: 13). While some academics may fail to accept the nontraditional criteria offered

-57-

by Patton, a compromise might be reached through the use of evaluation standards that
include: utility of the findings, feasibility of the findings, accuracy of the findings, and
propriety of the findings (Patton, 2002: 13).
Although, Patton offers a very compelling argument, a number of researchers may
not agree with his bold assertions. Thus, the current research effort will engage
traditional research evaluation criteria to interpret findings.
The Role of Data Collection in Quality Research:
According to Yin (2003) the quality of a study can be increased substantially
when the researcher adheres to three general principles of data collection (Yin, 2003: 83)
First, Yin suggests that data collection should include multiple sources of evidence that
converge upon the same findings. (Yin, 2003: 83). Yin identified six sources of
evidence available to the researcher. These sources include: documentation, archival
records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artifacts.
Second, Yin suggests the creation of a case study database to store all the data used
throughout the research project. A final recommendation posed by Yin involved the use
of a chain-of-evidence similar to that used by law enforcement personnel. By creating
such an evidence chain, the researcher essentially mitigates potential threats to validity.
Because Yin’s recommendations are thought to significantly contribute to effective data
collection, current study applications of each recommendation are discussed below.
Multiple Sources of Evidence:
As stated previously, Yin viewed the ability to provide multiple sources of
evidence as a major strength for case study data collection (Yin, 2003: 83). Because case
studies (especially single case studies) are more vulnerable to validity and reliability
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threats, the need for multiple sources of evidence is more apparent for case studies as
compared to other research methodologies. Thus, the researcher must take steps to
minimize validity threats whenever possible.
Differing Points of View:
While Yin (2003) identified the six sources of evidence discussed previously,
Creswell (2003) proposed only four sources. There was considerable overlap between
the sources listed by Yin and those suggested by Creswell, with Creswell advocating
observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual materials. This study also engaged
quantitative data collection and analysis through the evaluation of secondary survey data
as an additional source of evidence. As stated by Yin, quantitative findings serve to
strengthen qualitative results in this case (Yin, 2003).
Data Collection Procedures:
Data collection for this project involved three distinct phases. First, the researcher
reviewed a number of archival documents. Sources reviewed included Aerospace
Medical Technician specific documents, Congressional hearings, Government
Accounting Office reports, Base Closure and Realignment Commission reports,
Congressional Budget Office reports, and archival data provided by statisticians at the
Air Force Surgeon General’s Office.
During the second phase of data collection, the researcher assimilated the
necessary information to perform a qualitative content analysis on recent “Medical
Lessons Learned” in an effort to explore Research Question 2. In order to accomplish
this task, the primary researcher submitted a formal request for information to the site
managers of the Air Force Operations News Medical Lessons Learned website at
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(https://afopsnews.afmoa.af.mil/lessonslearned/). In submitting this request, the
researcher asked for all Lessons Learned addressing enlisted medical skills sustainment
training. In turn, the site managers reviewed massive amounts of data in search of
potentially relevant lessons learned and forwarded these cases to the researcher via email.
The third phase of data collection involved secondary survey data provided by the
Air Force Occupational Measurement Squadron(AFOMS), Randolph Air Force Base,
Texas. The researcher found this data relevant to the exploration of Research Question 4.
In attempting to answer this question, the researcher hopes to demonstrate disparity
between the deployed work environment and home station in terms of task frequency and
task difficulty.
Design Quality
Previous researchers have suggested two fundamental elements of design quality:
research quality and evidence quality. While research quality pertains to the scientific
process, evidence quality pertains more to a judgment regarding the strength and
confidence one has in the research findings emanating from the scientific process
(Mosteller and Boruch, 2002; Shavelson and Towne, 2002). West, King, and Carey
(2002) suggested three characteristics of evidence dictate its strength and utility (West,
King, and Carey, 2002):
•

The quality of the evidence

•

The quantity of evidence

•

The consistency of the evidence
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When assessing the quality of a particular study, qualitative researchers are more
interested in standards like purposefulness and explicitness of assumptions and biases.
Other important standards for qualitative researchers include rigor, completeness, and
coherence. Finally, qualitative researchers are also interested in the persuasiveness,
usefulness, and consensus demonstrated by a study (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 164-165).
Yin’s Logical Tests for Quality:
Yin (2003) suggested that four logical tests could be applied to determine the
quality of case-study research. Behavioral scientists apply these same tests to determine
the quality of empirical social research (Yin, 2003: 33-34). Because case studies are a
form of social research, Yin proposes the same logic tests used for empirical research
effectively apply to case-study research. Table 2 below describes the four logic tests and
their associated tactics as presented by Yin. The table also lists the phases of research in
which each tactic should occur to ensure effective case-study research (Yin, 2003: 34).
Table 2: Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (Adapted from Yin, 2003)
Tests
Construct validity

Case Study Tactic
• Use multiple sources of evidence
• Establish chain of evidence

Phase of research in
which tactic occurs
data collection
data collection

• Have key informants review draft case
study report
Internal validity

• Do pattern-matching
• Do explanation-building
• Address rival explanations
• Use logic models

External validity

• Use theory in single-case studies
• Use replication logic in multiple-case
studies

Reliability

• Use case study protocol
• Develop case study database
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data analysis
data analysis
data analysis
data analysis
research design
research design

data collection
data collection

Construct validity:
Construct validity addresses the degree to which inferences can legitimately be
made from the operationalizations of the study to the theoretical constructs on which
those operationalizations were based. Researchers achieve construct validity by
developing and administering the correct operational measures for the concepts under
study. This typically involves three distinct steps: (1) accurately defining variables, (2)
appropriately relating variables to objectives, and (3) effectively demonstrating that
measures are indicative of the variables they measure.
According to Yin (2003), construct validity is “especially problematic in case
study research,” because qualitative investigators frequently fail to sufficiently develop
operational measures (Yin, 2003: 35). To avoid this trap, Yin advises the researcher to
take two critical steps:
1.

Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and relate
them to the original objectives of the study).

2.

Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed
reflect the specific types of change that have been selected (Yin, 2003)

Further, as presented in Table 2, Yin (2003) identified three tactics used by case
researchers to ensure construct validity: (1) use multiple sources of evidence, (2)
establish a chain of evidence, and (3) have key informants review the draft case-study
report (Yin, 2003: 34). In an attempt to ensure construct validity, the researcher
employed each of these techniques (with slight modification to the third tactic as
necessitated by the research design).
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Construct Validity Tactics:
Multiple Sources of Evidence:
Yin’s first suggestion for ensuring construct validity necessitates multiple sources
of evidence. Sources for this study included archival evidence, content analysis, and
secondary survey data analysis. These three evidence sources were woven together
throughout the study like three strands of the same rope, significantly contributing to
construct validity. Steps taken to ensure each individual data source contributed to
construct validity are provided below.
Archival Evidence:
Facility closure and realignment data used for the historical analysis portion of
this project was provided by the Medical Plans and Programs Directorate of the Air Force
Surgeon General’s Office (Berthe and Kenndedy, 2005). This office frequently briefs top
level medical management, and the data they generate is subject to an extreme level of
scrutiny. Further, the Surgeon General’s Office serves as the highest level approval
authority or validating agency within the Air Force. Thus, the archival data used for
historical analysis was subject to intense and rigorous data validation before it was
deemed appropriate for the current study (Berthe and Kennedy, 2005).
Content Analysis:
The content analysis portion of the research required substantial efforts to ensure
a high degree of validity. Strict adherence to Neuendorf’s Content Analysis model was
ensured. Neuendorf’s model is basically a construct guide for content analysis presented
in the form of a flow chart (Neuendorf, 2002). The flowchart identified nine processes
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researchers can follow to assist them in ensuring valid constructs. A slightly modified
version of the flowchart is presented below in Figure 2 (Neuendorf, 2002: 50-51).

Content Analysis Flowchart

Figure 2: Content Analysis Flow Chart
(adapted from Neuendorf, 2002, pp. 50-51)
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Determining Final Reliability for Content Analysis:
While steps were taken to ensure adherence to Neuendorf’s suggestions for
ensuring reliability (multiple coders, coder training, codebook, and coding form), perhaps
the most important content analysis function described by Neuendorf is to determine a
final reliability assessment. According to Neuendorf, one method frequently used to
determine final reliability involves a measure of intercoder reliability using “raw percent
agreement” (Neuendorf, 2002: 148). While Neuendorf suggests “the final reliability
assessment should be performed on a separate randomly selected sub-sample during full
data collection to fairly represent the coders’ performance throughout the study,” this
proved impractical for the current research effort. Due to the simplistic nature of the final
analysis (lessons learned were coded as either “positive or negative” and only 59 lessons
learned were coded), each coder independently coded every lesson learned from the final
analysis. Thus, every lesson learned was used to determine inter-coder reliability.
The formula PAo = A/n “where PAo stands for ‘proportion of agreement,
observed,’ A represents the number of agreements between two coders, and n reflects the
total number agreements possible through analysis (number of units coded) (Neuendorf,
2002:149). The proportion of agreement statistic returns a value between 0.00 and 1.00
with 0.00 indicating a total lack of agreement between coders and 1.0 representing 100%
agreement between coders (Neuendorf, 2002). Because four coders were involved in the
coding process, six separate bi-coder PAos will be determined. These six PAos represent
the possible comparisons between independent coding efforts without repetition. In
addition to these PAos, a separate statistic will be calculated to demonstrate the overall
proportion of agreement for the final analysis. The grand PAo will be determined by
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dividing the total number of agreements and dividing it by 59 (the number of units used
for final analysis).
Validity of Secondary Survey Data:
The Aerospace Medical Technician survey data used for statistical analysis was
provided by the Air Force Occupational Measurements Squadron (AFOMS). This
squadron is one of the premier statistician consortiums of the Air Force. Data was
certified valid by the Air Force Occupational Measurement Squadron before the primary
researcher even received it. Interestingly, the quantitative data demonstrated construct
validity and internal validity because tasks surveyed were taken directly from the Career
Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP). Additionally, the data demonstrated a high
degree of external validity because study findings will apply to other medical subcommunities within the Armed Forces (Air Force Nurses, Navy Corpsmen, Army
Medics, etc). Having completed the review of validity factors concerning Yin’s first
suggestion for the assurance of construct validity, the thesis now addresses Yin’s second
suggestion.
Chain of Evidence:
Yin’s second suggestion for ensuring construct validity concerned a chain-ofevidence for the data collected. In completing this study, all data collected was placed on
a single thumb drive, and later transferred to a single compact disc (CD). Once the study
is complete, a copy of the disk will be sent to the study sponsor, and anyone else who
wishes to view the data or study results. By ensuring the disk is available, the researcher
is providing a means for interested parties to review the data in raw form (Yin, 2003).
The researcher maintained the chain-of-evidence as prescribed by Yin (2003) by storing
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relevant evidence in the database while conducting the study. Further, the researcher
ensured the integrity of the data by prohibiting access to anyone other than the coders and
the primary researcher. After the study is completed, anyone who requests access to the
research information will be acquiesced. Refer now to Yin’s third suggestion: have key
informants review the draft case-study report.
Review of Draft Case-study Report by Key Informants:
Because interviews were not a part of the case study process in this particular
research effort, there were no key informants to review the case study report. This
resulted in a slight modification to Yin’s third tactic for establishing construct validity.
Subject matter experts were substituted for key informants in this case. This ensured a
type of “reality check” regarding the research findings. The subject matter experts were
all senior ranking Aerospace Medicine Technicians. Further, each subject matter expert
had at least 17 years experience in the field.
Internal Validity:
Leedy and Ormrod (2003) asserted that internal validity is a measure of how well
the study’s design (and the data it yields) equips the researcher to form conclusions
pertaining to cause and effect or other relationships within the data (Leedy and Ormrod,
2001: 103-104). Creswell (1994) defined internal validity as “the accuracy of the
information and whether it matches reality” (Creswell, 1994: 158). While both of these
definitions have merit, Yin (2003) suggested internal validity is only applicable to causal
or explanatory case studies (Yin, 2003: 36). Because this study is exploratory in nature,
internal validity was not considered a vital threat. However, the researcher still followed
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established guidelines in an attempt to ensure the highest possible level of internal
validity.
Internal Validity Tactics:
In an effort to ensure internal validity for study, many of Yin’s proposed tactics
were implemented. First, the researcher used archival evidence to facilitate explanation
building with respect to base closure and realignment initiatives. Next, the coding team
used a “specialized” form of pattern-matching while performing the content analysis
portion of the research. Finally, the researcher followed established criteria during the
planning stage of the research to ensure the research design followed specific logic
models as suggested by Yin (Yin, 2003: 34). Together, these tactics will substantially
contribute to the study’s internal validity.
External Validity:
Leedy and Ormrod defined the external validity of a study as “the extent to which
its results apply to situations beyond the study itself (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 105).
Yin (2003) added that external validity is achieved in qualitative research when the
researcher uses analytical generalization to infer a specific set of results on some broader
group or theory. The researcher must take precautions not to “automatically” infer or
generalize. Any generalization or inference derived from a single case study can only be
considered theoretical until it is tested through replication logic (Yin, 2003: 37).
Reliability:
Bouma (2000) suggested that a study is considered reliable if “researchers using
the same measuring device would get the same results when measuring the same event
(Bouma, 2000: 86). Leedy and Ormrod added that the question of reliability is a question
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of consistency. As such, reliability is achieved when a study’s author takes steps to
ensure future researchers can use the same processes and procedures in the same way to
achieve the same results. Yin (2003) further suggests that a study may still be reliable,
even if the results of the study are different, as long as the procedures and processes were
applied in a manner consistent to the previous study (Yin, 2003: 37-38)). Sufficient
documentation serves as a primary means of ensuring reliability. By appropriately
documenting each step of the research and the protocols used, the researcher lays the
foundation for consistency in future research efforts. The case study database, the case
study protocol, the case study appendices, and even this chapter on case study research
methodology serve as sources of documentation that future researchers can use to
replicate or audit this study. These steps are in compliance with Yin’s suggested case
study tactics proposed to ensure reliability: (1) Use case study protocol, and (2) Develop
a case study database (Yin, 2003: 34).
Summary of Methodology:
This chapter described the research methods used to explore the skills sustainment
training environment for the Aerospace Medical Technician. The rationale for choosing
an overarching qualitative framework with a mixed methods approach was presented, as
was the rationale for choosing the single embedded case study research design. Finally,
data collection methods and the elements of design quality were discussed. Next, the
research turns to Chapter 4 where the full disclosure of data analysis is provided.
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IV. Discussion of Data
Chapter Overview:
The purpose of this chapter is to present the data collected through the applied
research methods in an attempt to provide answers for the research questions posed in
Chapter 1. Thus, this chapter begins with a qualitative representation of the current skills
sustainment training model. After discussing the current model, a brief quantitative
review of the historical data will demonstrate recent changes in the aerospace medical
technician skills sustainment training environment. Next, the results of content analysis
performed on USAF Lessons Learned will illustrate mounting concern from the field
with respect to aerospace medical technician skills sustainment training. Finally,
quantitative survey data will be used to demonstrate statistically significant differences
between deployed skills sustainment training environments and the skills sustainment
training environments currently offered to aerospace medical technicians at their home
station. The presentation of data throughout this chapter will be linked to research
questions to enhance comprehension of associations and relationships.
Addressing the Research and Investigative Questions:
Research Question 1:
What is the present model used to provide Air Force Aerospace Medical
Technician skills sustainment training?
The Current Aerospace Medical Technician Skills Sustainment Training Model:
Any attempt to demonstrate the current model for skills sustainment training
proves difficult, because such a model has not been formalized. However, the Aerospace
Medical Technician Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP) defines
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sustainment training as “recurring training required to maintain the skills of a qualified
individual to perform the duties required by the 4N0X1 AFSC (Harms and Cahill, 2002:
7).” In February of 2004, Change 1 of the CFETP was published. This document added
that sustainment training includes “formal training courses, such as Advanced Cardiac
Life Support, inservice training, and exercises” (Harms, 2004: 1). The CFETP also lists
the Readiness Skills Verification Program as a component of aerospace medical
technician skills sustainment training (Harms, 2002: 8). Further, because Qualification
Training (QT) occurs both during and after upgrade training, and because it focuses on
maintaining the skills and qualifications of assigned personnel, qualification training
must also be considered a component of skills sustainment training. Thus, a rough model
for current skills sustainment training practices can be formulated using these five
principle components: (1.) formal training, (2.) inservice training, (3.) Readiness Skills
Verification Program, (4.) exercises, (5.) qualification training. For further clarification,
refer to Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Current Medical Skills Sustainment Training Model
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Current Model Components Description:
The first component of sustainment training, formal training, includes actual “inclass” attendance in formal courses as offered by Air Education and Training Command
or other entities. For a few fortunate aerospace medical technicians, this may entail
attending courses offered at the Center for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills
(C-STARS) at Cincinnati, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland; or St. Louis, Missouri. For others,
it may involve attendance at the Air Force Critical Care Course presented by critical care
physicians and nurses at Wilford Hall Medical Center. Additionally, formal training
might include non-Air Force sponsored curricula such as Advanced Cardiac Life Support
(ACLS) and Pediatric Advanced Life Support (PALS) courses.
The second component of sustainment training, inservice training, is typically
offered by subject matter experts at the medical treatment facility, and is usually focused
on a single task or process. Because aerospace medical technicians are required to
maintain Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician (NREMT) certification,
they attend inservice training to obtain continuing education credits mandated by recertification requirements.
The third component of sustainment training, the Readiness Skills Verification
Program (RSVP), is described as “Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) specific sustainment
training designed to ensure all members with a fully qualified AFSC maintain the
required skill proficiency to perform their duties in a deployed setting” (Harms, 2002: 8).
The RSVP uses a series of readiness skills verification checklists to verify each members
current qualification for specific skills and tasks. These checklists are linked to the preexisting QTPs utilized for qualification training (Harms, 2003: 1).
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The fourth component of sustainment training, scenario based exercises, involves
simulations of actual events where technicians are provided the opportunity to put their
skill sets into practice. Exercises present technicians with true-to –life scenarios. The
realistic nature of exercises also assists leaders in identifying training deficiencies that
may be addressed through future inservice training.
Finally, the fifth component of sustainment training, qualification training, is a
form of “hands-on” performance training developed by subject matter experts and used to
qualify airman in specific positions or on specific pieces of equipment. Special
qualification training packages (QTPs) are developed to assist supervisors and trainers in
the administration of this training. As stated previously, because qualification training
occurs both during and after upgrade training, it must be considered a component of skills
sustainment training (Harms, 2002: 7).
Investigative Question 1:
What evidence suggests a formal model for aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training?
Current research revealed that while a formal model for aerospace medical
technician skills sustainment training has not been introduced, the principal components
of such a model have been identified, defined, and implemented. Thus, these
components can be used to formulate a rough model of current skills sustainment
practices as presented above in Figure 3.
Research Question 2:
Have there been recent changes to the aerospace medical skills sustainment
training environment that may contribute to the success or failure of the current model?
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While this question was largely answered during the literature review, a more
detailed look at the historical data provided by the USAF Surgeon General’s Office,
revealed exactly how extreme the aforementioned environmental changes have been
(Berthe and Kennedy, 2005). Data revealed that approximately 82 hospitals in the Air
Force inventory provided inpatient care and/or emergency services prior to the first base
closure and realignment initiative in 1988. Today, a mere 19 inpatient hospitals remain.
At first glance, it would appear as though this finding suggests a current impatient
treatment capacity roughly equivalent to 25% of the 1988 capacity. Figure 4 (below)
reveals the depth of reductions in USAF inpatient hospitals over the previous 19 years.
Air Force Inpatient Hospitals
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Figure 4: Number of Air Force Hospitals Offering Inpatient Services
After further review of the data, however, it becomes apparent that this statistic only tells
part of the story. While the loss of inpatient hospitals was immense, the loss of inpatient
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beds provides a more accurate indication of training opportunities lost to aerospace
medical technicians. This is because while some of the larger Air Force medical
treatment facilities remained open, their inpatient treatment capabilities were significantly
reduced. Figure 5 (below) reveals the decrease in inpatient bed capacity over the past 19
years for the six largest Air Force medical treatment facilities. These facilities are
located at Lackland AFB, Keesler AFB, Travis AFB, Andrews AFB, Wright-Patterson
AFB, and Eglin AFB. When inpatient capacity losses suffered through base closures and
reductions in inpatient bed capability for remaining facilities are examined together, one
can not help but consider the overall loss in inpatient capability and associated losses in
training capabilities as somewhat alarming.
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Figure 5: Inpatient Bed Levels for the Six Largest Air Force MTFs
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After revealing the two major sources of inpatient capacity reductions (closure of
facilities and loss of beds within remaining facilities), all that remains is to discuss the
overall reduction in inpatient capability for the Air Force. Figure 6 (below) shows the
actual overall decrease in inpatient capability during the base closure and realignment
(BRAC) era (1988 to present).
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Figure 6: Overall Air Force Inpatient Bed Availability
Prior to the first BRAC round in 1988, the USAF boasted some 5219 inpatient
beds. Today, the total number of inpatient beds is a mere 785. This equates to an 85%
reduction in inpatient bed capacity, and further suggests that present inpatient care
capabilities are actually only about 15% of what they were prior to Base Closure and
Realignment initiatives. Because the loss of inpatient beds necessitates a decrease in the
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number of inpatients at Air Force medical treatment facilities, training opportunities for
aerospace medical technicians have been significantly reduced as well.
While the loss of inpatient capability has been significant, other factors also
contributed to changes in the aerospace medical technician training environment. As
mentioned during the literary review, many Air Force medical treatment facilities offered
emergency services prior to BRAC. Today, only 6-10 emergency service departments
remain (Lewis, 2006). Typically, when medical treatment facilities lose their inpatient
capability, they lose their emergency service departments as well. Without emergency
service departments, medical treatment facilities are forced to refer emergency patients to
other facilities, and quite frequently, the referral facilities are civilian entities. The loss of
emergency patients to civilian treatment facilities represents another huge loss in terms of
training opportunities for aerospace medical technicians.
Investigative Question 2:
What changes have occurred with respect to land, labor, capital, and the nature of
work?
The review of historical data revealed the aerospace medical technician career
field has experienced extensive reductions in terms of land, labor, and capital. These
changes involved the loss of entire medical treatment facilities (MTFs), the loss of
available inpatient beds, the closure of emergency service departments, and increased
budgetary constraints. The review of historical data also revealed changes in the nature
of work. These changes were resultant to a paradigm shift away from inpatient and
emergency medicine toward outpatient and preventative medicine.

-77-

Research Question 3:
What indicators might suggest the current model has not successfully ensured
medical readiness for Aerospace Medical Technicians?
A brief review of available literature revealed that educators frequently use
training accessibility (Klatt, 1999; Ravet and Layte, 1998; Brennan and Johnson, 2004)
and training effectiveness (Shapiro, 1995; Kirkpatrick, 1998; Bringslimark, 2004) as
indicators of training quality. Because these determinants apply to aerospace medical
technician training, they were considered possible problem indicators with respect to the
current aerospace medical technician training model. Each of these indicators will be
examined separately below.
Training Effectiveness and Training Accessibility:
It was determined that a focused review of the Air Force Operations News
Medical Lessons Learned website would provide information concerning accessibility to
training and training effectiveness with respect to current aerospace medical technician
skills sustainment training practices. Thus, data was obtained from website and a form of
mini content analysis was performed on the resultant data.
In order to perform the aforementioned analysis, the primary researcher submitted
a request to knowledge managers at the primary Air Force Medical Lessons Learned
website (https://afopsnews.afmoa.af.mil/lessonslearned/). In submitting this request, the
researcher asked for all lessons learned from the past year (February 2005-February
2006) that potentially addressed enlisted medical technician training. The knowledge
managers at the website responded, in turn, with 162 lessons learned conveniently
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arranged on a spreadsheet to facilitate analysis. A copy of this spreadsheet is presented
as Appendix A of the study.
After the lessons learned were received from knowledge managers at the website
(https://afopsnews.afmoa.af.mil), the primary researcher assembled a team of four coders
at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. This team was comprised of the primary researcher
and three additional senior ranking aerospace medical technicians. Aerospace medical
technicians were chosen for the coding team because the study concentrated fully on the
aerospace medical technician career field (4N0X1). The experience levels of these
technicians suggested they were subject matter experts with respect to aerospace medical
technician skills sustainment training and were well suited for the relevant content
analysis.
Next, all four team members reviewed the Excel document to identify trends that
might suggest potential variables for the content analysis. After collaborating for some
time, the coding team determined that three variables should be included in the analysis:
(1.) the applicability of the lesson learned, (2.) the environment of the lesson learned, and
(3.) the nature of the lesson learned. The “applicability” variable referred to whether or
not the lesson learned truly applied to aerospace medical technicians. The “environment”
variable concerned the environment from which the lesson learned was submitted (real
world vs. exercise). Finally, the “nature” variable addressed whether the lesson learned
represented a positive or negative finding.
Rationale for Variable Selection:
The applicability variable was selected, because only Lessons Learned that
pertained to the aerospace medical technician career field were desired for further
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analysis. The environment variable was selected because many of the Lessons Learned
were from simulated situations (exercises) and may have skewed the real world data.
The nature variable was chosen, because the coding team felt lessons learned that were
negative in nature would be highly suggestive of problems attributable to the current
training model. Variable definitions and rationale for selection were placed in the content
analysis “coding book” as suggested by Neuendorf (2002). See Appendix B.
To ensure all lessons learned considered in the final analysis were from the real
world environment and applied to aerospace medical technicians, a preliminary analysis
using only the first two variables was conducted to identify lessons learned submitted in
response to exercises and lessons learned that did not address aerospace medical
technicians. Lessons learned submitted following exercises and those that did not apply
to aerospace medical technicians were removed from consideration in the final analysis.
During the preliminary analysis, an acceptance standard of 75% agreement
between coders was established as the criteria for including a lesson learned for final
analysis. The preliminary analysis resulted in 59 lessons learned identified for final
analysis. These 59 lessons learned were arranged on a separate Excel spreadsheet to
facilitate the final analysis. A copy of the spreadsheet containing the 59 lessons learned
evaluated during final analysis is included as Appendix C.
Final analysis involved only determining if the lessons learned reflected positive
or negative findings. For this portion of the analysis, the coders independently completed
coding forms, and returned them to the primary researcher. The primary researcher
completed a coding form as well. Please see Appendix D for a copy of the coding form
used for final analysis.
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Training Effectiveness:
Surprisingly, each of the lessons learned (100%) from the final analysis indicated
a negative finding. Determinations of the “proportion of agreement, observed” using the
formula PAo = A/n as described in Chapter 3, resulted in a value of 100% for all intercoder comparisons. This resulted in an overall proportion of agreement value of 100% as
well. In other words, each of the coders felt all applicable, real world lessons learned
posted to the Air Force Operations News Medical Lessons Learned website indicated a
training deficiency or the need for additional training. The high proportion of agreement
achieved is suggestive of definitive problems with respect to training effectiveness. In
further explanation, it appears the level of training effectiveness achieved through the
current aerospace medical technician skills sustainment model is less than optimal.
Training Accessibility:
While the effectiveness of training is a concern, another factor affecting skills
sustainment involves the aerospace technician’s accessibility to training. This factor also
proved problematic according to the lessons learned website with 13 of the final lessons
learned citing instances where technicians did not receive necessary training at all. In
further explanation, 22% of the final lessons learned indicated that training was either not
accessible, or at least not accessed. This is somewhat understandable as indicated during
the literary review, because the opportunity to train technicians with respect to inpatient
and emergency patient care is limited by the current outpatient focused patient care
environment. These limitations were brought about as a result of base closures, inpatient
unit closures, and emergency services department closures.
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C-STARS:
In an attempt to overcome this limitation, senior medical planners developed three
Centers for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills (C-STARS). The C-STARS
training centers are strategically located at Baltimore, Maryland; Cincinnati, Ohio; and
St. Louis, Missouri. The result of joint ventures between the Air Force and civilian
trauma centers, the C-STARS sites provide skills sustainment training in trauma
management and critical care by immersing medical personnel in real world trauma
situations ((https://kx.afms.mil/ ).
Training received through C-Stars is exceptional. Aerospace medical technicians
typically attend courses offered at Baltimore or St. Louis. They typically do not attend
courses offered through Cincinnati because these courses are specifically targeted toward
Critical Care Air Transport Teams. These teams include physicians, critical care nurses,
cardiopulmonary technicians, but not aerospace medical technicians.
C-STARS Baltimore:
The technician’s course at Baltimore is three weeks long, and includes the
following activities:
-- Five day Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support (PHTLS) course with outdoor exercises
-- High Performance Human Simulator Sessions
-- Human Cadaver Lab
-- Baltimore City Ambulance Ride-Alongs
-- Trauma Resuscitations in the STC Trauma Resuscitation Unit (TRU), ICU, ER, and
burn unit (https://kx.afms.mil/ )
C-STARS St. Louis:
Technicians who attend C-STARS at St. Louis receive a two week course of
instruction that includes:
-- Trauma refresher lecture series
-- EMT refresher training (if required)
-- EMEDS equipment refresher
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-- Clinical skills review
-- Human patient simulator sessions
-- St. Louis Fire Department ambulance ride-along
-- Air ambulance (ARCH) ride-along (optional, when available)
-- Clinical duties in ER, ICU and operating room (https://kx.afms.mil/)
While training received through C-STARs is exceptional, not all aerospace
technicians are fortunate enough to attend the training. In fact, less than 230 active duty
aerospace medical technicians have attended the course since its inception in 2002
(Taylor: 2006). According to the Aerospace Medical Technician Career Field Manager,
there are over 5,500 active duty aerospace medical technicians (Lewis, 2006). Thus, only
4% of the active duty aerospace medical technician population received training through
C-STARS. Last year (2005), only 88 active duty aerospace medical technicians were
fortunate enough to attend C-STARS (Taylor: 2006). If the Air Force continues to train
an average of 88 technicians per year and manning remains constant for the career field,
it will take approximately 60 years to train the active duty population, not to mention
national guard members and reservists. Further, because sustainment training is recurrent
in nature, technicians should probably receive C-STARS training annually or at least
biannually, placing even further limitations current accessibility. Thus, while C-STARS
training effectively increases technician trauma and readiness skills, it is not readily
accessible to all aerospace medical technicians because of training capacity limitations.
Investigative Question 3:
What insights can be gained from Air Force Lessons Learned with respect to
Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment training?
Review of the applicable lessons learned revealed that training effectiveness and
training accessibility are two important indicators suggestive of problems affiliated with
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the current aerospace medical technician skills sustainment training model. Each of these
indicators were consistently cited as problems in recent medical lessons learned, and
hence, should not be ignored be Air Force aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training curriculum designers.
Research Question 4:
Is a new Aerospace Medical Technician skills sustainment training model
warranted?
Based on this research, the answer to this question is a resounding “yes.” Simply
stated, aerospace medical technicians are not receiving adequate training for skills
sustainment as evidenced through content analysis of recent lessons learned. The Air
Force patient care environment has changed significantly. Thus, current and future
training initiatives must be instituted to compensate for these changes.
Investigative Question 4:
What are some of the existing problem areas the new model should address?
Once developed, the new training model should initially address training
effectiveness and training accessibility concerns as discussed previously. Additionally,
the new model should address the problem of “versatility.” For the purpose of model
development, versatility refers to the model’s ability to adapt to various patient treatment
environments. Medical leaders must ensure that sustainment training provided through
the new model is versatile enough to prove effective in both deployed and home-station
patient care environments.
While great effort has been expended in establishing the importance of preparing
technicians for deployment, the home station mission is equally important. Thus, we
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must not forsake outpatient-focused home-station training for the sake of trauma-focused
deployment specific training. Any model developed to ensure skills sustainment must
effectively train technicians on the primary components of both deployed and homestation patient treatment environments. This can only occur if medical planners are
willing to recognize there is a difference and institute the policy and procedures
necessary to create a new “real-world” training model that proves applicable to both
training environments. Further, once these policies and procedures are implemented,
medica leaders must monitor the training environment for further changes in an effort to
maintain model versatility.
Supportive Evidence Suggesting the New Model Should be Versatile:
Quantitative data analysis techniques were used to demonstrate a statistically
significant difference between deployed and home-station medical treatment
environments. This involved both descriptive statistics and analysis of variance
(ANOVA) using ordinary least squares (OLS). These techniques were performed on data
provided by the Air Force Occupational Measurement Squadron (AFOMS).
In September of 2004, AFOMS administered a job inventory survey to aerospace
medical technicians (Griffin-Hamilton: 2005). In completing this survey, technicians
indicated if they performed tasks listed in the Career Field Education and Training Plan
(CFETP). AFOMS analysts then determined the percentage of technicians performing
each task. Technicians were grouped according to skill level and duty status (deployed
vs. home-station). Individuals in the deployed group were actually deployed at the time
of the survey, or had recently been deployed (within the last 12 months). This survey
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provided an excellent opportunity to compare the aerospace medical technician deployed
and home-station work environments.
Prior to performing the ANOVAs, data was transferred from the training extract
provided by the AFOMS to an Excel spreadsheet. Several of the tasks surveyed by
AFOMS were specific to sub specialties within the aerospace medical technician career
field (neurology technicians, allergy immunization technicians, independent duty medical
technicians, etc.). These sections were not included in the analysis, because aerospace
medical technicians not assigned to these subspecialties do not perform sub-specialty
specific tasks. Furthermore, aerospace medical technicians who work in these
specialized areas receive additional training not received by the “average” aerospace
medical technician.
Additionally, certain sections of the survey focused on patient records, supply,
and other administrative duties. These sections were also excluded from analysis because
they do not require skills sustainment training and are not immediately concerned with
patient care. Further, any task that did not exceed 5% for any of the populations was not
considered representative for the entire population, and was therefore dropped from the
analysis. Thus, while the original survey inventoried 846 tasks, only 371 of those tasks
were considered applicable to the “average” aerospace medical technician. These tasks
were included in the descriptive statistics and ANOVAs performed below.
Because the current research effort focuses on sustainment training, a decision
was reached to include only “5” and “7” skill level technicians in the analysis. This
decision was based on Air Force Instruction 41-106 Medical Readiness Planning and
Training, which states, “enlisted personnel enter into sustainment training when awarded
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their 5 skill level” (Taylor, 2004: 25). While “3” level technicians are extremely
important to mission accomplishment, they have recently attended initial training, and
have not yet been certified on many Career Field Education and Training Plan tasks.
Technicians from the “9” level population were not surveyed by AFOMS, and thus, could
not be considered in the analysis. While this may be considered a limitation, it is
probably most appropriate because most 9 level technicians predominantly perform
managerial duties.
ANOVA Procedure:
Once the tasks and populations of interest were identified, and the data was
entered into Excel, descriptive statistics were accomplished for each population. The
descriptive statistics enabled a high-level comparison between the deployed and homestation work environments for both the “5” and “7” skill level populations of aerospace
medical technicians. For each population the number of tasks evaluated was 371.
Following the descriptive statistics, single factor one-way ANOVAs were
performed using ordinary least squares (OLS). In order to prevent multicolinearity issues
between populations, separate ANOVAs were performed on the “5” level and “7” level
populations.
“5” Skill Level Comparison:
With respect to “5” level populations, the deployed (Dep) active duty (AD)
population demonstrated a mean percentage of 23.62. This statistic revealed that an
average of 23.62% of all deployed active duty “5” skill level technicians perform the
tasks determined to be representative of the average aerospace medical technician as
derived from the Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP). For the “5” level
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home-station (HS) population the mean percentage of technicians performing indicated
tasks was 20.20. This finding suggests a difference with respect to technicians performing
CFETP prescribed tasks between the deployed and home-station work environments.
However, further analysis is required to determine if the identified difference is
statistically significant. Please refer to Table 3 (below) for additional information.
Table 3: “5” Skill Level Descriptive Statistics
DEP AD 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence (95%)

HS AD 5
23.61725067
0.869220863
21
6
16.74237621
280.3071611
0.187806368
0.885033916
80
2
82
8762
371
1.709232535

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence (95%)

20.20215633
0.792759902
17
4
15.26963408
233.1617251
0.366751642
0.949777789
74
1
75
7495
371
1.558879997

After completing the “5” skill level descriptive statistics, a single factor, one way
ANOVA was performed using OLS to test the assumption that deployed and homestation aerospace medical technician “5” skill level work environments will differ with
respect to percentage of technicians performing tasks. For the purpose of ANOVA, this
assumption was determined to be the research or alternate hypothesis. The null
hypothesis held that deployed and home-station “5” skill level work environments will
not differ with respect to percentage of technicians performing tasks.
Ho: Deployed (DEP) and Home-station (HS) “5” skill level work environments
will not differ with respect to the percentage of technicians performing tasks.
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Ha: Deployed and Home-station “5” skill level work environments will differ
with respect to the percentage of technicians performing tasks.
Refer to Table 4 (below) for the ANOVA demonstrating the results of the hypothesis
testing and additional information.
Table 4: “5” Skill Level ANOVA
ANOVA: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups
DEP AD 5
HS AD 5

Count
371
371

Sum
8762
7495

Average
23.61725
20.20216

Variance
280.3072
233.1617

Df

MS
2163.462
256.7344

F
8.426849

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
2163.462264
189983.4879

1
740

Total

192146.9501

741

P-value
0.003807

F crit
3.854056

“5” Level ANOVA Results:
At the 95% confidence level, a P-value less than 0.05 is statistically significant.
Because the P-value obtained for this particular ANOVA is well below this threshold, we
reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis. The difference between
deployed and home-station work environments with respect to tasks performed is
statistically significant for the “5” level population. A greater percentage of deployed “5”
skill level technicians perform indicated tasks when compared to “5” skill level
technicians at home-station.
“7” Skill Level Comparison:
With respect to the “7” level populations, the deployed population demonstrated a
mean percentage of 25.39. This statistic revealed that an average of 25.39% of all
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deployed “7” skill level technicians perform the tasks determined to be representative of
the average aerospace medical technician as derived from the Career Field Education and
Training Plan (CFETP). For the “7” skill level home-station population the mean
percentage of technicians performing indicated tasks was 18.12. This finding suggests a
difference with respect to technicians performing CFETP prescribed tasks between the
deployed and home-station work environments. However, further analysis is required to
determine if the identified difference is statistically significant. Please refer to Table 5
for additional information.
Table 5: “7” Level Descriptive Statistics
DEP AD 7
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence
Level(95.0%)

HS AD 7
25.38544474
0.996525915
19
6
19.19444468
368.4267065
0.179567211
0.843656784
80
1
81
9418
371
1.959564696

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance

18.1186
0.673061
14
4
12.96406
168.067

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence
Level(95.0%)

-0.1001
0.850414
61
2
63
6722
371
1.323504

After completing the “7” skill level descriptive statistics, a single factor, one way
ANOVA was performed using OLS to test the assumption that deployed and homestation aerospace medical technician “7” skill level work environments will differ with
respect to percentage of technicians performing tasks. For the purpose of ANOVA, the
assumption tested was determined to be the research or alternate hypothesis. The null
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hypothesis held that deployed and home-station “7” skill level work environments will
not differ with respect to percentage of technicians performing tasks.
Ho: Deployed and home-station “7” skill level work environments will not differ
with respect to percentage of technicians performing tasks.
Ha: Deployed and home-station “7” skill level work environments will differ with
respect to the percentage of technicians performing tasks.
Refer to the ANOVA results listed in Table 6 (below) for additional information.
Table 6: “7” Skill Level ANOVA
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups
Dep AD 7
HS AD 7

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Count
371
371

Sum
9418
6722

Average
25.38544
18.1186

Variance
368.4267
168.067

Df

MS
9795.709
268.2468

F
36.51752

SS
9795.708895
198502.6631

1
740

208298.372

741

P-value
2.4E-09

F crit
3.854056

“7” Level ANOVA Results:
Recall that a P-value less than 0.05 is statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level. The P-value obtained for this particular ANOVA was exceptionally
low at 0.0000000024. This value is well below the 0.05 threshold causing us to reject the
null in favor of the alternate hypothesis. The difference between deployed and homestation work environments with respect to tasks performed is statistically significant for
“7” level aerospace medical technicians. A greater percentage of deployed “7” skill level
technicians perform indicated tasks when compared to “7” skill level technicians at
home-station.
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Summary of Quantitative Analysis:
Through analysis of variance, this research demonstrates a statistically significant
difference between deployed and home-station work environments for both the “5” level
and “7” level aerospace medical technician populations. Medical leaders must take steps
to ensure both environments are addressed by any proposed skills sustainment training
model.
Chapter Summary:
This chapter began with a qualitative representation of the current skills
sustainment training model. After discussing the current model, a brief quantitative
review of the historical data demonstrated two decades of turbulent change in the
aerospace medical technician skills sustainment training environment. Next, the results
of content analysis performed on USAF Lessons Learned identified indicators that
suggest problems concerning the present aerospace medical technician skills sustainment
training model. Finally, quantitative survey data was used to demonstrate statistically
significant differences between deployed skills sustainment training environments and
the skills sustainment training environments offered to aerospace medical technicians at
their home station. The research now proceeds to Chapter 5 to discuss future research
considerations based on Chapter 4’s findings and present a proposed aerospace medical
technician skills sustainment training model as a potential solution for training problems
experienced in today’s highly mobile Air Force.
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V. Results

Chapter Overview:
This chapter begins with a discussion regarding whether or not thesis findings
supported the single study proposition. Next, the chapter provides recommendations for
consideration in developing a new model for aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training. Then, the chapter introduces a potential model for future aerospace
medical technician skills sustainment training. Following the introduction of a potential
model, the chapter turns to a discussion of proposed model limitations. Next, the chapter
lists opportunities for future research. Finally, a chapter summary is provided.
Study Proposition:
This research effort explored the proposition that numerous elements of the
Aerospace Medical Technician training environment have changed. The study
proposition was supported by literature review findings and the historical analysis of
archival data. Because the study substantiated monumental change within the aerospace
medical technician skills sustainment training environment, the methodology and model
employed to conduct skills sustainment training for Aerospace Medical Technicians
should adapt to compensate for changes observed and documented. Such adaptation
proves necessary to minimize the effects of limited resources realized in a training
environment plagued by right sizing and base closures.
Recommendations for New Model Consideration:
Defense experts referred to the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission
(BRAC) as “the mother all of all BRACs” (Turner, 2005). The changes recommended by
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this commission were more extensive than the changes rendered by all previous BRACs
combined. While previous BRACs (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995) combined to eliminate
approximately 20% of the Department of Defense (DOD) infrastructure, the 2005 BRAC
resulted in eliminating approximately 25% of the remaining DOD infrastructure (Turner,
2005). For the medical community, this loss equates to further reductions in the number
of emergency service departments, and the conversion of even more inpatient units to
outpatient care (Taylor, 2005).
Because these changes will be more radical than previous changes experienced by
the aerospace medical technician career field, it is imperative that any potential training
model proves robust against environmental changes within the skills sustainment training
environment. To achieve the required level of robustness, the model must ensure that
future training is both accessible and effective as discussed previously in this thesis.
Ensuring training is both accessible and effective proves extremely problematic,
especially when considering the aforementioned budgetary constraints. The Air Force is
not alone when confronting this problem, however, as civilian organizations face similar
challenges (Majdalany and Guiney, 1999).
Unlike the Air Force Aerospace Medical Technician Skills Sustainment Training
Program, however, many civilian organizations have found success addressing these
concerns through distance education (Harrington-Leuker, 1999). Curriculum designers
list three crucial elements necessary for a successful distance education program: (1.)
sound instructional design, (2.) appropriate applications of technology, and (3.) adequate
support for teachers, students and collaborative partners (Steiner, 1999).
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The Air Force is highly experienced with distance education programs. The
Extension Course Institute has used Career Development Courses (CDCs) (a form of
distance learning) to provide upgrade training to enlisted members for years. It is also
true that Air Force distance education is based upon a sound instructional design. Air
Force enlisted upgrade training is based on the Instructional Systems Design (ISD) model
(Hanks, 2005). This model is widely accepted in both civilian and military educational
programs (Carey and Carey, 2001). See Figure 7 below.

Figure 7: The ISD Model for Instructional Design
While Air Force distance education satisfies the first crucial element of effective
distance education, deficiencies become apparent with respect to the remaining elements:
the application of available technology and adequate support for teachers (trainers),
students (trainees), and collaborative partners (subject matter experts). There is little to
suggest Air Force distance education fully utilizes available technology at this time.
Most distance education courses are not available on-line, and they do not offer student to
instructor, student to student, and student to subject matter expert interactions similar to
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those made possible through modern information technology. In general, the distributed
learning courses provided to aerospace medical technicians are received in paper-based
format. Sometimes compact discs accompany the paper-based courses, but the discs
simply replicate the information provided through the paper-based course. It is
somewhat surprising that technology does not play a more substantial role in the delivery
of skills sustainment training, especially when one considers the enhanced technology
focus of the Air Force. For example, senior Air Force leaders advocate the importance of
net-centric warfare, but foundational elements of enlisted distance education are not netcentric.
The deficiency in the final critical element: support for teachers (trainers),
students (trainees), and other collaborative partners (subject matter experts) is witnessed
through the inability of Air Force educators to provide an environment where trainees can
practice critical tasks from the Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP), as
discussed previously in the thesis. Without access to inpatient and emergency service
environments, technicians will not retain valuable knowledge gained through exceptional
initial training programs.
Addressing Identified Deficiencies:
One application that may assist educators in applying available information
technology to enhance aerospace medical technician skills sustainment training is the use
of asynchronous learning networks (ALNs). ALNs could potentially assist trainees and
trainers with the accessibility issues mentioned previously, because they make training
accessible to virtually any authorized individual with internet access.
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Asynchronous Learning Networks Defined:
An asynchronous learning network (ALN) is defined as “a network developed for
people for the purpose of facilitating the accession of knowledge. It combines self-study
principles with focused asynchronous interactivity with others. ALNs allow users to
employ computer and communications technologies to tap into remote learning
resources, including instructors and other students. Asynchronous Learning Networks
are people networks established for anytime, anywhere learning” (Campbell: 1998).
More specifically, an asynchronous learning network is a nontraditional education
and training medium that employs communications technologies to combine self-study
and asynchronous interactivity between students and instructors, between students and
other students, and between students and other collaborators, such as subject matter
experts. Because the network is asynchronous, students are not required to be on-line at
the same time as instructors or other students. They may access course information at
their own convenience. Students are also encouraged to post comments concerning the
material to virtual classroom discussion groups and access the comments posted by
fellow students and other collaborators. The World Wide Web serves as a chief
component of asynchronous learning network technology. It is used more frequently
than any other ALN learning tool (Mayadas: 1997).
The Promise of Asynchronous Learning Networks:
ALNs are effective because they leverage Web based technology to overcome
separation in time and space between students and instructors. They also significantly
reduce the cost of providing training in terms of travel and printing costs. In such an
environment the student remains joined with fellow students and the instructor(s) through
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common interests and electronic communication. Computer technology and the world
wide web afford the opportunity to employ learning strategies like individualized
tutorials and group projects when members are at a distance. They also let students
contribute ideas for ongoing simulations and models at their own convenience. Through
asynchronous learning networks, courses offered all around the world provide students
and instructors opportunity to collaborate using Web-based technology such as Webpages, virtual bulletin boards, list-servs and additional conferencing systems. ALNs also
take advantage of Web-based technology to create an electronic medium for students to
complete and submit assignments (Campbell: 1998).
True ALNs also utilize synchronous technology for short periods of time. For
example, an instructor who provides a course of instruction through an ALN may require
a proctored examination at a specified time and place. He or she may also require an inperson kickoff meeting to introduce students to each other and the course. It is also not
uncommon to see occasional synchronous chat or lab sessions required for ALN students
within close-proximity of each other. In fact, some researchers advocate the creation of
powerful learner-centered networks through harnessing the potential of synchronous and
asynchronous instructional delivery methods. The resultant “Networked Learning
Environment” significantly improves the effectiveness of distributed (distance) education
(Chute, Sayers, and Gardner, 1997). An illustration of the learner-centered model for
networked learning systems is provided below in Figure 8. This model takes full
advantage of asynchronous and synchronous technology and fully qualifies as an
asynchronous learning network.
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Figure 8: The Networked Learning Environment
*From: Chute, et. al., 1997, p. 75
By now, you have probably assimilated a good working definition for ALNs
(sometimes referred to as networked learning environments). It is also essential that you
develop an understanding of what is and what is not considered an ALN. Thus, we now
turn our attention toward identifying the primary components that actually make up such
a network. According to Jack Wilson, PhD (the current President of the University of
Massachusetts, and former CEO of UMassOnline) a good asynchronous network will
consist of or use the following components (Wilson, 1997):
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Delivery on standards-based multimedia personal computers equipped for live
video/audio interactions and connected to a robust Internet Protocol (IP)
multicasting network
A mix of synchronous and asynchronous activity
Use of Internet and/or CD-ROM-based multimedia materials
Live audio and/or video interactions among the students and with faculty
Use of professional quality software tools for computer aided design (CAD),
symbolic math, spreadsheets, word processing, etc.
Small group discussions
Question-and-answer tools to verify content retention
Collaborative software for application sharing and application synching over the
network
Access to rich resources on the network
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•
•

Floor control to allow classroom coordination for both instructor-led and studentcentered learning
Course administration to track student progress and to identify students during
synchronous interactions

Using the definitions and critical components described above to guide our
understanding of ALNs, we find workshops that leverage Web-based technology to
facilitate frequent episodes of online conferencing and communication with others fulfill
the requirements of an asynchronous learning network. Surprisingly, even a text-based
course that requires students to use Web based technology such as listservs or e-mail to
discuss course content and assignments qualifies as an asynchronous learning network.
More frequently, however, ALNs combine both computer-based training and Web-based
technologies to provide a more robust learning experience for students.
Our working definition of ALNs may be further strengthened by providing a few
examples of learning environments that do not qualify as ALNs (or networked learning
environments). Dr. J. Olin Campbell of the Sloan Consortium provided a few examples
in his paper entitled Asynchronous Learning Networks: Evaluating Anytime/Anywhere
Learning. According to Campbell, a distance education course based on synchronous
audio or video presentations does not qualify as an asynchronous learning network.
Traditional in-service training and conferences do not qualify as ALNs either, because
they require the constant presence of students and instructors. Simple computer based
instruction, video taped instruction, and mail based correspondence courses definitely do
not qualify as ALNs because they lack the rapid and substantial interactivity with other
students and instructors inherent to asynchronous learning (Campbell, 1998).
ALNs are becoming a standard conduit for the impartation of knowledge in both
education and business. Slowly and surely this distributed learning technology has
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transformed computer based instruction from what was once thought to be a second rate
knowledge transfer medium into a highly respected and widely accepted educational
construct. Though once rejected by academia, the level of acceptance toward ALNs
demonstrated by major universities today serves as a testament to the ubiquitous nature of
this growing technology. Asynchronous learning may soon affect every stage of
education within the United States. The number of learning institutions using ALN
technology to improve existing course offerings (and even provide additional course
offerings) continues to grow each year (http://www.scis.nova.edu/~taburich/async.html).
When considering the level of success demonstrated civilian institutions after
implementing ALNs, it is not hard to imagine ALNs performing a critical role in
improving accessibility to training as mentioned previously in this paper. ALNs
represent an existing technology that could prove quite useful in improving aerospace
medical technician skills sustainment training. For further information concerning
asynchronous learning networks visit the asynchronous learning network website on the
World Wide Web (www.aln.org).
Support Issues:
Asynchronous Learning Networks could also prove helpful in dealing with
demonstrated deficiencies in terms of support for trainees, trainers, and subject matter
experts. However, additional technology is also required. As stated previously in the
thesis, the greatest lack of support concerns the apparent inability of Air Force leaders to
provide adequate training environments with respect to inpatient and emergency medical
skills sustainment. With sparse inpatient units and emergency service departments, many
trainees are not exposed to trauma patients or patients suffering from injuries or
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conditions consistent with combat related injury or illness. Again, information
technology might provide our only hope for addressing this concern. Trainees and
trainers may overcome their lack of adequate exposure to patient treatment scenarios
through utilizing high fidelity patient simulators.
Patient Simulators: A New Standard in Skills Sustainment Training:
A model’s ability to realistically simulate operational or “real world” events is
described as “model fidelity” (Hays and Singer, 1989). Researchers suggest three levels
of model or simulator fidelity: low fidelity, mid or moderate fidelity, and high fidelity
(De Lorenzo, 2005; Yaeger and others 2002). These same three terms are also used to
describe levels of simulation training: low fidelity training, mid fidelity training, and
high fidelity training. Low fidelity training “permits trainees to practice skills in
isolation” (Yaeger and others, 2002). This typically involves working with simple
mannequins. Moderate fidelity training offers more realism, but “lacks the cues
necessary for total immersion in the situation” (Yaeger and others, 2002). High-fidelity
training incorporates extensive use of multimedia resources providing real-time
physiological responses on the part of the simulated patient. These responses include all
the necessary information for medical personnel to formulate decisions (such as
diagnostic decisions) and implement patient treatment regimes. In high fidelity training
scenarios, the simulator is highly interactive demonstrating positive or ill effects based on
treatment decisions implemented by medical personnel (De Lorenzo, 2005).
An Indicator for Simulator Fidelity:
While abundant indicators of model fidelity have proven somewhat elusive,
researchers have suggested a model’s ability to integrate the three domains of learning

- 102

(cognitive, affective, and psychomotor) as described by Bloom and others (1956);
Krathwohl and others (1964); and Simpson (1972) serves as one indicator of model
fidelity (Friedrich, 2002). Thus, in order for a simulator to be considered a “highfidelity” simulator, it must effectively integrate the domains of learning as described
above. High fidelity patient simulators accomplish this by fully implementing existing
information technology to create a more robust learning environment for trainees (Yaeger
and others, 2004; De Lorenzo, 2005).
Because traditional patient simulations typically involved the use of training
mannequins, animal or cadaver models, and the moulage of simulated casualties, they
proved somewhat ineffective in achieving desired levels of realism. (De Lorenzo, 2005).
Low and mid fidelity simulators proved especially problematic in the affective domain
because students found it difficult to value unrealistic training scenarios.
In contrast, high-fidelity patient simulators offer treatment scenarios so realistic
they provide signs and symptoms necessary to practice “history taking, physical
examinations, invasive procedures, fluid therapy, pharmaceutical therapy, and surgical
interventions” (De Lorenzo, 2005). Even more remarkable, high fidelity patient
simulators are being used more frequently at all levels of medical skills sustainment
training. While high fidelity patient simulators have typically been reserved for
professional staff at larger Universities and training hospitals, recent training applications
utilizing high fidelity patient simulators have been offered to pre-hospital personnel (First
Responders and EMTs) at Central Michigan University (http://www.med-smart.org/).
While high fidelity patient simulators provide promise for improving support to
trainers and trainees, they have also demonstrated the ability to improve training
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effectiveness (Gordon and Armstrong, 2002). In a study conducted at Harvard Medical
School, researchers demonstrated that even a single exposure to high fidelity patient
simulators improved training effectiveness for an experimental group of medical
residents as compared to a control group that was not exposed to high fidelity simulation
(Gordon and Armstrong, 2002). A separate study measured the trainee’s physiological
response to stress through heart rate variability during resuscitations using high fidelity
patient simulators and during actual live resuscitation efforts. The study effectively
demonstrated the extraordinary level of realism high fidelity patient simulators provide
by demonstrating no statistically significant difference in trainee heart rate variability
when comparing simulated and actual patient resuscitation efforts (Yaeger and others,
2004) and (Murphy and others, 2004).
The One-Two Punch:
Because asynchronous learning networks have proven exceptionally useful in
improving accessibility to training and high fidelity patient simulators have proven
successful in improving training effectiveness, it seems reasonable to imagine an effort to
integrate asynchronous learning networks and high fidelity patient simulators into all
components of aerospace medical technician training could greatly enhance present levels
of accessibility and efficiency. Further, if these efforts prove successful, new levels of
aerospace medical technician readiness may be attained. Thus, a new model for
aerospace medical technician skills sustainment training should attempt such an
integration effort. A potential model that demonstrates such an integration is provided
below in Figure 9. In this model, ALNs and high-fidelity patient simulators are used to
enhance training within each component of medical skills sustainment training.
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A New Model for Aerospace Medical Technician Skills Sustainment Training:
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Figure 9: A New Model for Aerospace Medical Technician Skills Sustainment Training
Model Validity Concerns:
As stated from the earliest conception of this project, no effort is made to validate
the new model, as this would require an entirely separate study. The main objective of
this study was to demonstrate the need for change, and to provide an example of what
such a change might entail. It is worthy to note, however, that the University of
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Michigan, Michigan State University, and Central Michigan University have each
achieved such an integration through technology provided by Medical Simulation
Modeling Advanced Research and Training (MedSMART) (http://www.med-smart.org/).
Hints of Validity From a Relevant Case:
MedSMART provides improved accessibility, effectiveness, and affordability
with respect to medical skills sustainment training through the integration of distributed
learning technology and high fidelity human patient simulators (HPS). This not for profit
organization effectively provides training for field management of combat trauma,
disaster, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) field casualty care. Even more
fascinating, advanced distributed learning principles (made possible through ALN
technology) and distributed interactive simulation techniques (made possible through
high-fidelity patient simulators) make up the chief components of their program.
The distributed interactive simulation offered through MedSMART involves the
use of simple mannequins with sensors networked to centrally located high fidelity
simulators. This cutting edge technology enables MedSMART to provide medical skills
sustainment training to personnel deployed anywhere in the world. In further
explanation, MedSMART overcomes barriers to distance based simulation training
through the integration of sophisticated, remote controlled human patient simulators with
“an interactive 3-D video-teleconferencing/telepointing Internet-based network whose
geographical range is unlimited” ((http://www.med-smart.org/).
Because this technology can be provided anywhere a network can be established,
it has the potential to effectively address problems associated with the disparity
demonstrated between deployed and home-station training environments. Differences in
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training ability when comparing deployed to home-station aerospace medical technician
training environments could be successfully mitigated through similar applications of
available technology (http://www.med-smart.org/).
Air Force Applications:
The Air Force already owns and operates several high fidelity HPSs. Additional
HPSs are available to Air Force personnel through C-STARS as previously discussed.
Imagine the improvements that could be realized if Air Force educators find a way to
network these high fidelity patient simulators with inexpensive sensor mannequins at the
different Air Force MTFs, thereby integrating the expertise of remotely located subject
matter experts with localized training sites. This style of networking is definitely
possible through ALNs and advanced distributed learning technology. It seems plausible
that a networked learning environment as envisioned by this research project would
improve present aerospace medical technician skills sustainment training capabilities
dramatically.
Overall Validity of Findings:
Because validity tactics for the individual components were described in detail in
Chapter 3, this section will focus on addressing the overall validity of the study. Recall
form Chapter 3 that Yin provided a list of case study tactics capable of improving the
four forms of validity identified in Chapter 3: construct validity, internal validity,
external validity, and reliability. A brief review of the case study tactics employed to
ensure critical elements of the aforementioned forms of validity are presented below.
The review begins with strategies employed to ensure construct validity.
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Construct Validity:
Yin asserted that construct validity is improved through utilizing multiple sources
of evidence, developing a “chain-of-evidence,” and by having key informants review the
draft case-study report (Yin, 2003).
Multiple Sources of Evidence:
Yin’s first suggestion for ensuring construct validity necessitates multiple sources
of evidence. Sources for this study included archival evidence, content analysis, and
secondary survey data analysis. These three evidence sources were woven together
throughout the study like three strands of the same rope, significantly contributing to
construct validity.
Chain-of-Evidence:
Yin’s second suggestion for ensuring construct validity concerned a chain-ofevidence for the data collected. In completing this study, all data collected was placed on
a single thumb drive, and later transferred to a single compact disc (CD). Once the study
is complete, a copy of the disk will be sent to the study sponsor, and anyone else who
wishes to view the data or study results. By ensuring the disk is available, the researcher
is providing a means for interested parties to review the data in raw form (Yin, 2003).
The researcher maintained the chain-of-evidence as prescribed by Yin (2003) by storing
relevant evidence in the database while conducting the study. Further, the researcher
ensured the integrity of the data by prohibiting access to anyone other than the coders and
the primary researcher. After the study is completed, anyone who requests access to the
research information will be acquiesced.
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Review of Draft Case Study by Key Informants:
Yin’s third tactic for establishing construct validity was slightly modified. Yin
proposed that key informants should review the draft case study report. For this study,
however, subject matter experts were substituted for key informants. This ensured a type
of “reality check” regarding the research findings. The subject matter experts were all
senior ranking Aerospace Medicine Technicians. Further, each subject matter expert had
at least 17 years experience in the field.
Internal Validity:
In an effort to ensure internal validity for study, many of Yin’s proposed tactics
were implemented. First, the researcher used archival evidence to facilitate explanation
building with respect to base closure and realignment initiatives. Next, the coding team
used a “specialized” form of pattern-matching while performing the content analysis
portion of the research. Finally, the researcher followed established criteria during the
planning stage of the research to ensure the research design followed specific logic
models as suggested by Yin (Yin, 2003: 34). Together, these tactics substantially
contributed to the study’s internal validity.
External Validity:
Leedy and Ormrod defined the external validity as “the extent to which its results
apply to situations beyond the study itself (Leedy et. al, 2001: 105). Yin (2003) added
that external validity is achieved in qualitative research when the researcher uses
analytical generalization to infer a specific set of results on some broader group or theory.
The researcher must take precautions not to “automatically” infer or generalize. Any

- 109

generalization or inference derived from a single case study can only be considered
theoretical until it is tested through replication logic (Yin, 2003: 37).
While it seems logical that the results of this study would apply to medical
technicians in the sister services (Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard), Yin’s warning not
to automatically infer suggests that external validity must be listed as a potential
limitation of the study. This makes sense because this thesis effort represented an
embedded single case design. As a single case study, findings must be considered
theoretical until validated through replication as suggested by Yin (2003:37)
Reliability:
Bouma (2000) suggested that a study is considered reliable if “researchers using
the same measuring device would get the same results when measuring the same event
(Bouma, 2000: 86). Leedy and Ormrod added the question of reliability is a question of
consistency. As such, reliability is achieved when a study’s author takes steps to ensure
future researchers can use the same processes and procedures in the same way to achieve
the same results. Yin (2003) further suggests that a study may still be reliable, even if the
results of the study are different, as long as the procedures and processes were applied in
a manner consistent to the previous study (Yin, 2003: 37-38)).
Sufficient documentation serves as a primary means of ensuring reliability. By
appropriately documenting each step of the research and the protocols used, the
researcher lays the foundation for consistency in future research efforts. The case study
database, the case study protocol, the case study appendices, and the chapter on case
study research methodology serve as sources of documentation that future researchers
can use to replicate or audit this study. These steps are in compliance with Yin’s
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suggested case study tactics proposed to ensure reliability: (1) Use case study protocol,
and (2) Develop a case study database (Yin, 2003: 34).
Benefits of Research:
This research validated the need for a new aerospace medical technician skills
sustainment training model and provided a potential model for future implementation. It
is the hope of the researcher that the suggested training model will enable meaningful and
lasting knowledge transfer for Aerospace Medical Technicians, thereby increasing
existing levels of medical readiness. Additional benefits realized through this research
include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A broad-brush view of problem areas regarding required training as mandated in
the CFETP.
Confirmation of decreasing resources experienced by Air Force Aerospace
Medical Technician trainees and trainers.
Exploration of decreasing experience levels exhibited by Air Force Aerospace
Medical Technician trainers.
Application of findings to other medical related AFSCs.
The development of a potential alternate training model that further exploits the
advantages of existing resources such as IT.
A starting point for future research concerning the efficacy of such a model.
Insight into the nature of Air Force Aerospace Medical Technician training
issues/problems as reported by AF trainees and trainers.
Possible applications to other medical and non-medical career fields throughout
the Department of Defense (DOD).

Limitations:
There were many limitations associated with this research effort. First, while the
changes listed in this study are valid, a possible confounding variable exists in the recent
merger between the 4N (formerly medical service specialists) and the 4F (formerly
aerospace medicine technician) career fields. While the merger probably significantly
impacts training, the scope of the merger issue is significant enough to warrant a separate
study.
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Second, the content analysis portion of this study was based on lessons learned
from a single website. It is quite possible that these lessons learned are not entirely
representative of the potential lessons learned that exist. The primary researcher
encountered extreme difficulty in attempting to locate lessons learned that pertained
specifically to aerospace medical technicians. It was somewhat disappointing that no
positive natured “real-world” lessons learned were posted to the study’s website.
Third, the software suite used by AFOMS offered no export or import feature, and
was not made available to the primary researcher. This proved problematic, as the
primary researcher was not able to perform desired sorting of data for further analysis.
For example, the ability to sort responses according to nature of work (outpatient vs.
inpatient, etc.) would have been very helpful. The inability to perform these actions
detracted somewhat from the original intent of the study.
Fourth, because the study was exploratory in nature, the findings are considered
theoretical until proven through replication logic. Still, the findings of individual
component analyses help to mitigate this limitation. For example, while the study is
exploratory in nature, findings resultant to historical analysis and quantitative analysis
(ANOVA) must be considered objective in nature.
Finally, no attempt was made to test the validity of the model. Because this study
was already multi-faceted in nature, such a test would have proven overwhelming to the
current study. A separate study to evaluate model validity should be conducted, however,
before actually implementing the proposed model. This concludes the list of limitations.
The thesis now turns to future research opportunities.
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Future Research:
This research effort revealed numerous opportunities for future research. First, a
follow-on study to establish model fidelity might be in order. Second, a study that
compares the confidence and competence of aerospace technicians assigned to critical
care areas to those assigned to outpatient clinics with respect to the top 100 skills
performed in deployed work environments would be very interesting. Finally, a study
utilizing the technology acceptance model might be useful in determining resistance to
change with respect to the implementation of ALNs and high-fidelity human patient
simulators.
Conclusion:
Since their earliest days with the Army Air Corps, Air Force enlisted medical
technicians experienced a robust skills sustainment training environment through
exposure to multi-faceted patient scenarios. Available training environments included
inpatient care, outpatient care, and emergency services. The diversity of training
scenarios experienced was possible because operating budgets were large and the
Department of Defense medical infrastructure was enormous.
Today (after five separate base closure and realignment initiatives), medical funding
and infrastructure is but a shadow of what it once was. Budget constraints, and the rising
cost of healthcare have necessitated a purposeful movement away from inpatient and
emergency care, toward outpatient and preventative medicine.
Although changes in the Air Force health care delivery system may be necessary, the
closure of inpatient units and emergency service departments around the Air Force has
significantly impacted the Air Force’s ability to train medical professionals and para-
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professionals for operations in a deployed setting, especially in the area of medical skills
sustainment training. This research effectively validated the need for an alternate model
for medical skills sustainment training. Further, an alternate model for aerospace medical
technician skills sustainment training was introduce with the hope that model integration
will assist students and trainers in overcoming training limitations realized in a training
environment plagued by personnel reductions, budgetary constraints, and the near
complete loss of inpatient and emergency services.
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Appendix A: Air Force Operations News Medical Lessons Learned

Synopsis of Issue

1

2

3

4

5

Experienced Crew Management
Cell (CMC) staff can enhance and
have a direct impact on the
mission.
CCATT assets were inappropriate
and in some cases ineffectively
utilized to accomplish the mission.
The 459th Life Support personnel
are to be commended for issuing
CCATT necessary gear without
written guidance and offering a last
minute “crash course” on its use.
Many validating Flight Surgeons
had little if any understanding of
what types of patients CCATT
teams were capable of moving and
what patients did not require CATT
expertise resulting in poor,
inefficient utilization of the asset.
If TRAC2ES is the main enterprise
for patient regulations, it is
imperative that medical units,
regardless of branch of service, are
proficiently trained.
Ensure unit personnel have
necessary expertise.

6

7

8

9

Development of a standardized C2
Lesson Plan created by a single
AMC Directorate which includes
CONOPS, UTC training
requirements, and Theater Chain
of Command is required.
The opinion held by some
superiors that we will not need
training in rotary-wing or other
special operations environments is
not valid.
Hands on experience for our
members during the Motown
Medics training program was
extremely beneficial.

Source Document
459th AES, Andrews
AFB, MD 25 Feb 03-4
May 03; 775 EAES, 13
Aug 03
491st {later 791st}
EAES, Ramstein AB,
Germany, 7 April to 31
July 2003
491st EAES, 27 Feb
03-19 Jul 03

491st EAES, 27 Feb 03
- 19 Jul 03

86 MDG/ASF,
Ramstein, GE, no date

320 EAES, Seeb,
Oman, 2 Mar to 20 May
2003
775 EAES, 13 Aug 03
AE presentation
(Leesburg), BG
Hemminger
EMF TEAM
2/OIF/JDOTF-N/FOB
102, Dec 02-May 03

Remarks
Limited experience at all
levels is a fact of life. We
can recommend experience
as a key requirement to the
personnel system.
Doctrine on employment of
CCAT requires revision,
CCAT training program
requires revision.
Seems to be a current theme
with CCAT on issues of
training & equipment.
It seems the doctrine on how
to employ the CCAT is either
not clear or the field is not
well versed. Or I suspect a
combination of both. I
recommend a re-look at the
doctrine and concept of
operations for the
employment of the CCAT.
How are we training our
personnel? Fire hose
method?
Limited experience at all
levels is a fact of life. We
can recommend experience
as a key requirement to the
personnel system.
How are we training our
personnel? Fire hose
method?

No comments

Date
Completed
2/23/2005

2/23/2005

2/23/2005

2/23/2005

2/23/2005

2/23/2005

2/24/2005

2/24/2005

No comments
186 MDS, 7/13/2003
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2/24/2005

Synopsis of Issue

10

11

12

13

14

15

16
17

18

Current training does not prepare
crews for combat conditions.
Development of an AE Survival
Training for AECM and CCATT
personnel is needed. Training
needs to reflect the environment
with sustainment training gearing
towards trauma.
Training is required for AE
personnel in the area of
interoperability between AE
airframes, rotary wing and fixed
wing aircraft.
Flight line driving is base specific
and must be accomplished once
unit members arrive at their
destination base. EMEDS, CCAT
and AE personnel must be familiar
with flight line operations at various
locations.
Insufficient training on non-medical
assets and equipment resulted in
AECM and CCATT personnel were
unfamiliar with the use of WRM
Equipment.
Lack of preparedness on part of a
lot of the officers and enlisted alike,
i.e. not physically fit, no knowledge
or experience with wearing MOPP
gear, improper response to alarm
conditions, etc
Line commanders fail to
understand food safety/contracting
issues. Background: Commanders
sacrifice safety for morale and
“good will”. Impact: Mission
compromised by food-borne
outbreak/poor contracting with no
QA provisions.
OIF Blood Support-Supplies, in
particular Collins boxes, boxes at
times were in short supply.
Implement vehicle licenses into
UTC training requirements.
Ramstein provides an excellent site
for training, enables deployed
personnel to understand function at
our mission when deployed.

Source Document

AE Lesson Learned
Power Point
presentation, Sep 03; -AMC/DOOE 491ST
EAES, Mar-Aug 2003

775 EAES, 13 Aug 03
EMF TEAM
2/OIF/JDOTF-N/FOB
102, Dec 02-May 03;

Scott AFB, Illinois
7/30/2003

444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16
Jan 03

386 EMDG, Ali Al
Salem, Suedbeck, 12
Dec 02 to 28 April 03

BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec
03 Site Y 22 Jan 2003
to 12 May 2003
AF Blood Program
Office, Lt Col McBride,
Jan 03 - present
444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16
Jan 03
444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16
Jan 03
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Remarks

Date
Completed

Valid requirement for combat
survival training.
2/24/2005

I was under the impression
that AE crews where trained
on diverse platforms. If not
then this issue must be
addressed in light of our
operational tempo.
Flight line driving
requirements are one of the
basic core requirements.
Lack of training in this case
became a safety risk.
Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK

2/24/2005

2/24/2005

2/25/2005

This is a powerful comment
on our readiness status
2/25/2005

Sick troops due to food
poisoning will not improve
morale.
2/25/2005

Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK
Flight line driving
requirements are one of the
basic core requirements.
No comments

2/25/2005
2/25/2005

2/25/2005

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Synopsis of Issue

Source Document

Staying current in ACLS, ATLS,
PALS certification is essential in a
deployed environment.

Maj John Cotton, no
location, no unit, Sep
03; Al Dhafra,
9/19/2003 Capt Teresa
Goodman, Sep 03,

Medical Groups need to deploy
their best (not their worst)
members. Lack of adequately
trained and motivated personnel
are being deployed without
opportunity to complete training
necessary for mission
accomplishment.
I thought that medicine would be
my biggest challenge. Instead it
was administrative, planning,
manning documents and chain of
command issues.
There was insufficient preparation
for the repatriation portion of
personnel recovery duties prior to
deployment and no clear and
concise view of Combatant chainof-command.
No established method to produce
operational psychologists who
have the necessary training,
certifications, and experience to
meet AFSOC requirements.
Providers are not prepared to deal
with operational stress reactions.
More training in the use of side
arms was necessary. The
management of weapons was
inconsistent. Additionally, other
important security and survival
measures were lacking such as
searching personnel for weapons
and using maps for coordinates.
The deploying dentist needs to be
fully aware of what the EMEDS
Allowance Standard contains and
capable of setting up all equipment
by themselves.
The staff at CRTC Alpena has
done an outstanding job of making
the training realistic and
meaningful.
Lack of EMEDS MIN XRAY, ACR
2000, and ULTRASOUND training
for X-ray technician.

Capt Teresa Goodman,
Sep 03, no unit, no
location-- 386 EMDG,
Ali Al Salem, Suedbeck.

Capt Teresa Goodman,
Sep 03, no unit, no
location-- 386 EMDG,
Ali Al Salem, Suedbeck.
BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec
03 Site Y 22 Jan 2003
to 12 May 2003
Mental Health
Consultant, Col Talcott,
no date--Deployed
Medical Care
presentation, Col
Cristianson, no date

Remarks

Date
Completed

No comments
2/25/2005
Lack of training is a recurrent
theme.
2/25/2005

Chain of Command Issues.
2/25/2005
The issue of Chain of
Command Confusion
repeats itself.

Would this require a special
course to prepare a
psychologist for SOF support
& deployment.

2/25/2005

2/25/2005

All facets of training seem to
require top down review.
EMF TEAM
2/OIF/JDOTF-N/FOB
102, Dec 02-May 03

379th Air Expeditionary
Wing (AEW), Al Udeid
Air Base (AUAB)
EMEDS Training 2003
– Alpena CRTC,
Michigan, 7/13/2003
444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16
Jan 03
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2/25/2005

Good point, the question is
who is responsible for
becoming aware and trained
on the TOE? EMEDS or the
Dentist?
Good review.

2/28/2005

2/28/2005
Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK-ACC

2/28/2005

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

Synopsis of Issue

Source Document

I think it is essential for ALL
medical people who are deploying
to go to EMEDS training, it was the
best thing I could have done.

321st Expeditionary
Medical Operations
Squadron, Masirah
Island Air Base, Oman,
30 May 2002—04 Sept
2002

Lack of MFST and EMEDS training
for deploying providers
Major deficiency noted in training to
use the TRAC2ES, SIMLM, TCAM
and other applications for AFMS
personnel deploying to the AOR.
Add special equipment training
(forklift, water buffalo towing, etc.)
for enlisted and selected officers.
Inadequate training of EMEDS
CC/staff to interact with other
disaster assets.
EMEDS, CCAT and AE personnel
unfamiliar with flight line
operations.
Personnel were not trained on
Global Expeditionary Medical
System (GEMS) software prior to
deployment resulting in a high
requirement for technical
assistance placed on limited
computer support staff.
Medical planners fill requirements
via capability (“spaces”…not
“faces”). UTCs not trained or
exercised to standards. Expertise
and capability varied greatly.
GME programs suffered due to
mobility.
The CONOPS for the FFGKV team
is not consistent with how the team
was utilized compromising team
integrity and training.
The implementation of new
information technology systems
during significant combat
operations put undue stress on
Component staffs.
No communication/coordination
between BIO, CEX, BAT for WMD

Al Udeid AB, Qatar,
9/15/2003
HQ ACC AAR Review,
Aug 03 IM/IT
presentation, Col Janice
Lee, no date
EMEDS Conference,
23-24 May 02 & MacDill
AFB, FL, Jun 03
EMEDS Conference,
23-24 May 02 & MacDill
AFB, FL, Jun 03
Deployed Medical Care
presentation, Col
Cristianson, no date
444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16
Jan 03 & 458 EMS,
Constanta, Romania,
TSgt Posten, no date.
BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec
03
No name of unit or
person mentioned.
BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec
03-379th EMEDS
Souda Bay, Greece. 3
Mar - 12 Apr 03

Remarks

Date
Completed

Good follow up
recommendations.
2/28/2005

Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK
Medical System personnel
do not deploy with EMEDS?
Added training would assist
EMEDS package in
becoming more selfsufficient.
Teaching Federal Response
Plan to command staff is a
step in the right direction.
Embedding planning staff
with that expertise?
Flight line driving
requirements are one of the
basic core requirements.
Added training would assist
EMEDS package in
becoming more selfsufficient.

Was this an isolated incident
or a constant problem with
personnel sourcing this
UTC?
No comments.
Was this an isolated incident
or a constant problem with
personnel sourcing this
UTC?

2/28/2005

3/1/2005

3/1/2005

3/1/2005

3/1/2005

3/1/2005

3/2/2005

3/2/2005

3/2/2005

No comments.
No name of unit or
person mentioned.
363 EMDG/SGPC,
Prince Sultan Air Base,
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3/2/2005
Good review. Coordination
on WMD is essential

3/2/2005

Synopsis of Issue

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

AFR/ANG received greater access
to Comm assets. MAJCOM
purchase a complete set of
communications equipment for
training.
Current local readiness training is
inadequate for real world, bare
base deployment situations
Extended Reach Concept.
Training: Field ATLS protocol was
strictly adhered to, and life
threatening injuries were identified
in prompt fashion.
Training: Litter command, control,
and movement were performed
safely. Patients were placed on
the litter using appropriate spinal
precautions.
Training: Airway compromised
patients were identified quickly and
appropriate actions were taken.
Training: In addition, airway
patients were organized in the
triage site next to one another, and
reassessed frequently. Prompt
intubations were performed when
airway function deteriorated.
Training: There was an excessive
amount of burn victim patients with
airway compromise.
Training: In addition to prompt
airway management, fluid
resuscitation was begun early and
appropriately, which is essential to
decreasing the morbidity and
mortality of burn victims.
Training-CRITIQUE: Not enough
litters.
Training-CRITIQUE: No use of
medical supplies during mass
casualty inspections creates an
artificial environment.
Training-CRITIQUE: There was
lack of manpower at the incident
site.
Training: Field fracture
management was quickly
performed using appropriate
splinting technique, which allowed
safer patient transport and further
damage.

Source Document
AE Lesson Learned
Power Point
presentation, Sep 03,
AMC/DOOE
BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec
03-379th EMEDS
Souda Bay, Greece. 3
Mar - 12 Apr 03
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005

Remarks

Date
Completed

This should be moved to
Equipment.
3/2/2005
Was this an isolated incident
or a constant problem with
personnel sourcing this
UTC?

3/2/2005

No comments.
7/5/2005
No comments.
7/6/2005
No comments.

7/6/2005

No comments.
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005

7/6/2005

No comments.

7/6/2005

No comments.
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005

7/6/2005

No comments.

7/7/2005

No comments.
7/7/2005
No comments.

7/7/2005

No comments.
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
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7/7/2005

Synopsis of Issue

52

53

54
55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

Training-CRITIQUE: Significant
delay in medical response;
Approximately 58 minutes after the
incident, the first medical response
team arrived.
Training-CRITIQUE: Insufficient
training on proper ambulance
loading. Patient’s loaded into
ambulances incorrectly.
Training-CRITIQUE: They were
loaded in an order that didn’t make
the highest priority the first off
Training-CRITIQUE: Pt’s were
being loaded over Pt’s already in
the ambulance.
Training: Annual home station field
exercises should include
deployable equipment training/use,
including Global Expeditionary
Medical Service database.
Training: Upon arrival, no 4N0X1s
with ambulance driver’s
qualifications were also certified to
drive on the flight line. This
necessitated EOSS personnel
taking time to train them locally.
Training: EMEDS training every
two years is not sufficient for
people to maintain proficiency on
deployment specific medical
equipment and databases. These
are rarely used by personnel at
home station.
Medical Education and Training:
Participated in medical education
and training of EMEDS personnel,
Dust-off medics, and Army medical
staff.
Training: All potential ambulance
drivers should be qualified/trained
in flight line driving prior to
deployment.
Training: Once deployed,
personnel must adapt to and
learn/relearn to use the new
equipment. The equipment is also
maintained by a contract company.
Training: Recommend IDMT’s
rotate through Drug Testing Office
at DM. Currently the 1st Sgt gets
the training

Source Document

506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS, Major
Zierold, USAF, MC 2
July 2005
506 EMEDS AAR,
Kirkuk, Iraq, 14
September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
506 EMEDS AAR,
Kirkuk, Iraq, 14
September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
506 EMEDS AAR,
Kirkuk, Iraq, 14
September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
506 EMEDS AAR,
Kirkuk, Iraq, 14
September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
506 EMEDS AAR,
Kirkuk, Iraq, 14
September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
506 EMEDS AAR,
Kirkuk, Iraq, 14
September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
Inca Gold After Action
Report, CURAÇAO,
NETHERLANDS, 10
Jan 2005
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Remarks

Date
Completed

No comments.
7/7/2005
No comments.
7/8/2005
No comments.
No comments.

7/8/2005
7/8/2005

No comment.
8/12/2005
No comment.
8/12/2005

No comment.
8/12/2005

No comment.
8/12/2005
No comment.
8/12/2005
No comment.
8/12/2005
No Comment.
8/26/2005

Synopsis of Issue

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

Facilities & Materiel: A digital X-ray
unit was received at the very end of
the rotation (last 2 weeks) and was
not utilized due to existing
personnel’s unfamiliarity with the
system.
Joint: There was NO training or
processing at Fort Benning. This
was a complete waste of time and
only served to pull our deploying
airmen away from their families
early.
Training: There was no training on
how the Army accomplishes
documentation of occupational and
environmental exposures to
personnel on deployment as
required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Presidential Directive 5.
Training: This course concentrated
on Army doctrine and introduction
to some of the Army preventive
medicine regulations. There was
very little review of the contents of
the applicable regulations.
Training: The 1st PMTAF attended
a one week training course at the
Army Center for Health Promotion
and Preventive Medicine
(CHPPM).
Accomplishments: This was
successfully tested during two base
wide Mass Casualty exercises.
Nursing also utilized as liaison
between local hospitals and 386
AEW/EMDG CC.
Training: A positive success was
conducting hands on training with
CE Readiness and Fire
Department counterparts to keep
informed on other functional's
equipment capabilities, limitations,
and expertise.
Training: Helicopter experience –
CASF members need recent
familiarization with the on-load and
offload procedures for UH-60s and
Chinook UH-47s. Army Med Evacs
use this airlift.

Source Document

AAR, 386th EMG,
Desai, LtCol, Ali Al
Salem AB, Kuwait,
March 2004

AAR-1st PMTAF, LtCol
Duque, Camp Udairi,
Kuwait, June 2004

AAR-1st PMTAF, LtCol
Duque, Camp Udairi,
Kuwait, June 2004

Remarks
Reoccurring issues of
deployed personnel not
trained on deployed
equipment.
Army requirement should be
checked at Air Staff level to
see if it's valid for medical
support personnel.
Lack of training in sister
service procedures are
crucial for a smooth
operation.

Date
Completed

9/2/2005

9/2/2005

9/2/2005

No comments.
AAR-1st PMTAF, LtCol
Duque, Camp Udairi,
Kuwait, June 2004

AAR-1st PMTAF, LtCol
Duque, Camp Udairi,
Kuwait, June 2004
AAR, 386th EMG,
Desai, LtCol, Ali Al
Salem AB, Kuwait,
March 2004

9/2/2005

No comments.
9/2/2005
No comments.
9/2/2005

No comments.
E-Mail DTG 1
September 2005, 6:30
AM, SMSgt Wiederholt,
USAF

9/9/2005

No comments.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.
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Synopsis of Issue

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

Training: Personnel assigned to
Bioenvironmental Engineering
need to be certified to run the HAPSITE, a crucial piece of monitoring
equipment.
Training: As flying missions
continue to grow and diversify, an
assigned flight surgeon to EMEDS
would greatly enhance patient care
for all personnel on flying status.
Training: The severity and intensity
of patient exposures necessitate a
staffing enhancement
consideration. Also, nutritional
medicine has been a huge benefit
to the CASF mission.
Training: Mission staffing
adjustments – Flight Surgeons and
Nurses and Medical Techs would
be better able to perform in Balad if
they have recent/current trauma,
critical care, or emergency
medicine experience.
Training: Licenses and
certifications/licenses need to be
current through the period of
deployment for a member to
volunteer. Also, members need to
report with their credentials or 6part folders.
Training: Also, some staff members
EMT certifications expired while
deployed, resulting in reassignment
to ancillary duties.
Training: Early mission
assignments are based on the
expectation staff members will
report qualified to perform the
mission. Suggests rolling fleet to
ensure each reserve, guard, or
active base has access to train with
various vehicles.
Training: For the CASF, many
members arrived without Ambus or
even Bus on their licenses. Other
vehicles of opportunity were
assigned, including HUMVEES, 2
½ Ton, Stakebeds and 1 Ton
Pickups.

Source Document

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

Remarks

Date
Completed

No comments.
9/9/2005
No comments.
9/9/2005
No comments.

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

9/9/2005

No comments.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

9/9/2005

No comments.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

9/9/2005

No comments.
9/9/2005
No comments.

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

9/9/2005

No comments.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.
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9/9/2005

Synopsis of Issue

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

Training: Only two of the four
temporary 4B071’s
(Bioenvironmental Engineering)
were trained to run the HAP-SITE
equipment - equipment crucial to
the 4B Wartime Concept of
Operations.
Training: Personnel Reporting
without Certifications and Driver
Training – Approximately 40% of
the reporting staff were without
driver’s license certifications in
mission assigned vehicles.
Training: This was a fairly useful
course though much time was
spent on water, air or soil sampling
kits which the Bioenvironmental
Engineering technicians already
had some proficiency with.
Training & Joint: More time should
have been spent on Army
procedures, organization, protocol
and points of contact.
Training & Joint: The instructors
were very knowledgeable, but
where our expectations were what
we could currently expect to find in
this particular theater working with
the Army
Training & Joint: and how to
prepare, as well as what was
expected of us, the course was
more generic and non-specific.
Training: The 2nd PMTAF-C team
taught a monthly Field Sanitation
Team course to Army and Navy
personnel and provided as often as
requested, Medical Threat briefings
to personnel deploying to Iraq.
Training: The 2nd PMTAF-C team
was not responsible for tracking
immunizations, conducting Post
Deployment Health Surveillance
reports or DNBI reporting.
CATM training scheduled for day
prior to deployment causing undue
stress.
We were required to carry
weapons in Kuwait, it was very
beneficial to complete weapons
training just prior to deployment.

Source Document

Remarks

Date
Completed

No comments.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

9/9/2005

No comments.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5
March-4 June 2004.

AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR, Captain Eaton,
Camp Buehring,
Kuwait, Aug – Dec 04
AAR, Captain Eaton,
Camp Buehring,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
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9/9/2005

No comments.
9/16/2005

No comments.
9/16/2005
No comments.
9/16/2005

No comments.
9/16/2005
No comments.
9/16/2005

No comments.
9/16/2005
No comments.

9/16/2005

No comments.
9/16/2005

Synopsis of Issue

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

Training: We were required to
attend a CHPPM Preventive
Medicine course to be familiarized
with Army procedures for their
Preventive Medicine teams.
Training: Lack of
instrument/procedure operating
instructions - compiled 27
instruments and procedure OIs;
prepped lab for sustainment
operations.
Training: Lack of priority system for
lab results contributed to poor
utilization of lab personnel devised lab result priority system
(STAT, ASAP, Routine) and
designated time for routine lab
draws to better utilize limited lab
personnel.
Training: Developed policy letter
outlining requirements for
processing and shipping
specimens.
More hands-on training for wartime
skills. In-service training is not
enough. Staff with training from the
inner city hospitals had the best
experience and skills.
Lack of adequately trained and
motivated personnel, Lack of basic
medical materials and supplies

Training programs must be staffed
above their critical RRC required
manning, in order to support
mobility while avoiding violation of
RRC rules.
Taking a program down below
critical RRC staffing numbers by
deployments should only be done if
there is no other alternative.
Training-continued from above:
instead of making the injured
troops travel. This would mirror the
Army PT role to various FOBs in
theater.
Training: This keeps boots on the
ground in the AOR, and eases the
aeromedical evacuation system
burden.

Source Document
AAR, Major ShibukawaKent, Camp Arijfan,
Kuwait, 10 Aug 04 – 21
Dec 04
AAR-407th EMDG,
Colonel Williams, Silver
Rotation, 7 March-7
June 2004

Remarks

Date
Completed

No comments.
9/16/2005
Reoccurring theme.
9/30/2005

No comments.
AAR-407th EMDG,
Colonel Williams, Silver
Rotation, 7 March-7
June 2004
AAR-407th EMDG,
Colonel Williams, Silver
Rotation, 7 March-7
June 2004
Maj Bischel, Chief
Nurse +25, FFEP4
Qatar, January 03 May 03
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem:
Leolyn.Bischel@spangd
ahlem.af.mil
Sharon G. Harris, MD
Col, USAF, MC
Endocrinology Flight
Commander,
Sharon G. Harris, MD
Col, USAF, MC
Endocrinology Flight
Commander,
Major Reinhardt, Chief,
Physical Medicine &
Occupational Therapist,
Balad AB Iraq- 25 April
2005
Major Reinhardt, Chief,
Physical Medicine &
Occupational Therapist,
Balad AB, 25 April 2005
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9/30/2005

No comments.
9/30/2005
Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK
Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK

Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK
Line Item Closed via E-mail
DTG 10/19/05 14:37 PM:
MEFPAK

10/19/2005

10/19/2005

10/19/2005

10/19/2005

Requires follow up.
10/21/2005
Requires follow up.
10/21/2005

Synopsis of Issue

99

100

101

102

103
104

105

106

107

Training: If injured Marines,
Soldiers, Airmen and Sailors are
referred to PT/OT acutely, there is
a higher likelihood they may be
able to return to full duty with
minimal downtime.
Training: If sufficient PT/OT
providers available in the AOR,
then they could take helicopter
flights to various FOBs to provide
care
Training: Need to educate
providers throughout the AOR of
rehabilitative services available.
All personnel on the EMEDs
package be trained in its use (this
does usually happen in most bases
that have an EMEDs mission)
Deployed personnel without
training
Nurse midwife deployed as chief
nurse but had no prior EMEDs
training.
She was unfamiliar with the
contents of the EMEDs and where
she would be obtaining equipment
and supplies that were not included
in the package.
This will gradually build a civilian
core and offer stability to the
programs.
VA ventures or even employing
active duty medical in civilian
facilities may need consideration in
order to develop, enhance, and
maintain top-notch clinical skills.
Turnover is extremely high,
especially in internal medicine.

108

109

This will gradually build a civilian
core and offer stability to the
programs.

Source Document
Major Reinhardt, Chief,
Physical Medicine &
Occupational Therapist,
Balad AB Iraq- 25 April
2005
Major Reinhardt, Chief,
Physical Medicine &
Occupational Therapist,
Balad AB Iraq- 25 April
2005
Major Reinhardt, Chief,
Physical Medicine &
Occupational Therapist,
Balad AB Iraq- 25 April
2005
DR-35 Major Wanda
McFatter, 21
September 2005
DR-35 Major Wanda
McFatter, 21
September 2005
DR-35 Major Wanda
McFatter, 21
September 2005
DR-35 Major Wanda
McFatter, 21
September 2005
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
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Remarks

Date
Completed

Requires follow up.
10/21/2005

Requires follow up.
10/21/2005
Requires follow up.
10/21/2005
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/2/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/2/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/2/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/2/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006

Synopsis of Issue

110

111

112

113

114

115
116

117

118

119

120
121

(the RRC requires 5 years of
experience for program directors),
it will become increasingly difficult
to keep the PD and key teaching
positions filled with qualified
military officers.
The ops tempo has been high
since 911, and shows no sign of
decreasing.
Ensure all nurses in the reserves
are working at least part-time in the
medical arena, especially when
filling primary slots on UTCs
It has been reported on different
instances and settings that there
were issues with the clinical ability
of some reserve nurses.
Future training program gaps need
to be identified proactively and
civilian fills sought as soon as it is
apparent that there is no qualified
military officer.
Decreased skill level of military
staff may be an increasing
problem.
Clinic arena does not allow for the
technician to solidify their new
learned profession.
Additionally, issues were reported
where medical technicians,
especially those whose only work
experience has been in clinics, had
difficultly with basic nursing skills
i.e. Continued below
With ever increasing RRC
requirements for training programs
and the need for experienced
people in key positions-continued
below
New technicians directly out of
technical school working in the
clinic environment or only work in
the in-patient setting for a brief
period of time before moving to the
clinic.
Even some of the AF “hospitals”
now only see very low acuity
patients.
Skills learned in school are never
developed.

Source Document
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Colonel Harris,
Consultant to the Air
Force Surgeon for
Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC.
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Remarks

Date
Completed

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

1/16/2006

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Synopsis of Issue
122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

May also begin to see a decrease
in skill levels in active duty
nurses/even physicians.
Issue: The knowledge levels of
both nurses and medical
technicians have been addressed
as concerns.
Air Force Medical facilities have
scaled down in-patient to more
outpatient services.
Intravenous flow drip rates, starting
intravenous lines, common illness
signs and symptoms etc.
Supporting Information: Reserve
nurses, must hold an active nursing
license
Ensure nurses maintain enough
civilian working hours as a nurse to
be on a UTC.
Cleanliness - Toilets were located
too far. Nurses and Techs emptied
bedside commodes frequently until
soldiers could walk the distance to
the latrine located outside the
hospital.
Logistics – The FFGKV equipment
package did not arrive in theater
until +40 days after the team
arrived at the bare base.
D5 1/2NS and D5 1/4NS IV fluids
were not available on the supply
list so staff had to mix it
themselves, depleting other stocks
and exposing patients to possible
hazards such as medication errors
and infection.
Nurses and Technicians performed
as housekeepers, adhering to a
schedule of sweeping, mopping
and dusting.
Nurses had to obtain them from
their original bases.

131

132

Nursing Care - Nursing care plans,
Operating Instructions, and other
important forms were scarce.
Medical Supplies and Materials Logistic packages were
inadequate. Packages coming from
other bases often had old,
incomplete equipment.

Source Document
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Major William
Satterfield, 60
MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
3 October 2005.
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Remarks
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

Date
Completed
1/16/2006

1/16/2006

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Synopsis of Issue

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

Staff had to beg, borrow, and steal
to get adequate material to do their
jobs.

Wool blankets are sent, causing a
fire hazard to inpatient units with
oxygen.

Adequate facilities – Need
separate tents for enlisted and
officer staff.

Critically the nursing RSVs to
ensure they include all important
basic and specialized skills
required for wartime settings.
Provide more focused, welldeveloped training annually rather
than the current cycles of Q 15-30
months based on the AEF cycles
One of the most important lessons
is this: everyone worked hard every
day for so many hours.
Many nurses needed to talk to the
psychologist about the experiences
they heard about.

Equipment – The equipment
package for the FFGKV team was
inadequate for the bare base
environment with limited external
sources or supplies/equipment.
Many things could have been
missed because nurses were only
used to healthy patients coming in
for a specific complaint needing
nothing but that one system taken
care of.
Team Integrity and Training – The
CONOPS for the FFGKV team is
not consistent with how the team
was utilized.

Source Document
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Major William
Satterfield, 60
MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Major William
Satterfield, 60
MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.
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Remarks

Date
Completed

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Synopsis of Issue

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

The training for the FFGKV is
inadequate.
Joint Operations Concerns – The
medical screening process for
other services Reserve
components and the Air National
Guard did not meet the same
standards as the Air Force.
Ensure logistical packages are
appropriate and adequate for
current times

In-service training is not enough.
Staff with training from the inner
city hospitals had the best
experience and skills.
The FFGKV was not properly
trained on joint service policies and
standards.
Assign new medical technicians to
inpatient units directly out of school
for solidification of education from
tech school.
Also, look at duty assignments and
alternation between clinic facilities
and in-patient facilities to maintain
skill levels.
Ensure deployable facilities are
provided educational material for
in-field OJT.
Explore other avenues of
maintaining skill levels, i.e. expand
CSTARS to more individuals, VA
ventures, civilian ventures with
local communities.
Lack of adequately trained and
motivated personnel.

151

152

Medical Groups should deploy their
best (not their worst) members.
One nurse sent because her unit
wanted to get rid of her.

Source Document
Major William
Satterfield, 60
MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.
Major William
Satterfield, 60
MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Major William
Satterfield, 60
MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3
October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
3 October 2005.
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Remarks
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

Date
Completed

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

1/23/2006

1/23/2006

1/23/2006

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Synopsis of Issue
More hands-on training for wartime
skills.
153

154

Compassion - soldiers needed to
talk about things. Many were sent
to the psychologist after nurses
spent time talking to them.
Basic nursing care needs to be
emphasized.

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

Total bed baths needed to be given
to soldiers who had been out in the
elements for 4 - 8 weeks wearing
the same uniform and never taking
a bath.
That couldn't be over looked and
nurses needed to make sure they
saw every inch of the soldiers’
body.
More training on chemical and
biological agents, detection, and
treatment.
Nurse was supposedly an Intensive
Care Unit nurse, but did not have
the necessary skills.
Nurse routinely committed errors (6
medication errors and 10 breeches
in standards of practice in one
shift) in addition to numerous near
misses.
She was transferred from ICU into
a general Med-Surgery unit under
another nurse’s supervision. She
seemed well meaning but very
dangerous.
Lack of basic medical materials
and supplies.

Source Document
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
3 October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
3 October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
3 October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
3 October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem,
Germany, 3 October
2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
3 October 2005.
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Remarks

Date
Completed

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006
Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.
1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Appendix C: Content Analysis Coding Book

Content Analysis Variables:
-

Applicability: Does the lesson learned actually apply to aerospace medical
technicians?

-

Environment: Was the lesson learned submitted from a real-world or scenario
exercise environment?

-

Nature of Finding: Did the lesson learned reflect a positive or negative finding?

Rationale for Variable Selection:
-

Applicability: The “applicability” variable was selected, because only lessons
learned pertaining to the aerospace medical technician career field were desired for
further analysis.

-

Environment: The “environment” variable was selected after noting that many of
the lessons learned referenced simulated situations (exercises) and may have
skewed the real world data.

-

Nature of Finding: The “nature of finding” variable was chosen, because the
coding team felt lessons learned that were negative in nature would be highly
suggestive of problems attributable to the current training model.
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Appendix C: Real World Aerospace Medical Technician Lessons Learned

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Synopsis of Issue

Source Document

Remarks

Ensure unit personnel have necessary
expertise.

320 EAES, Seeb, Oman,
2 Mar to 20 May 2003

Limited experience at
all levels is a fact of life

The opinion held by some superiors that we
will not need training in rotary-wing or other
special operations environments is not valid.

EMF TEAM 2/OIF/JDOTFN/FOB 102, Dec 02-May
03

No comments

2/24/2005

Current training does not prepare crews for
combat conditions. Development of an AE
Survival Training for AECM and CCATT
personnel is needed. Training needs to reflect
the environment with sustainment training
gearing towards trauma.
Training is required for AE personnel in the
area of interoperability between AE airframes,
rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.

AE Lesson Learned
Power Point presentation,
Sep 03; --AMC/DOOE
491ST EAES, Mar-Aug
2003

Valid requirement for
combat survival
training.

2/24/2005

775 EAES, 13 Aug 03
EMF TEAM 2/OIF/JDOTFN/FOB 102, Dec 02-May
03;
Scott AFB, Illinois
7/30/2003

I was under the
impression that AE
crews where trained on
diverse platforms.
Flight line driving
requirements are one of
the basic core
requirements.

2/24/2005

444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16 Jan
03

Line Item Closed via Email DTG 10/19/05
14:37 PM: MEFPAK

2/25/2005

386 EMDG, Ali Al Salem,
Suedbeck, 12 Dec 02 to
28 April 03

This is a powerful
comment on our
readiness status

2/25/2005

444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16 Jan
03

Flight line driving
requirements are one of
the basic core
requirements.
No comments

2/25/2005

Flight line driving is base specific and must be
accomplished once unit members arrive at
their destination base. EMEDS, CCAT and
AE personnel must be familiar with flight line
operations at various locations.
Insufficient training on non-medical assets
and equipment resulted in AECM and CCATT
personnel were unfamiliar with the use of
WRM Equipment.
Lack of preparedness on part of a lot of the
officers and enlisted alike, i.e. not physically
fit, no knowledge or experience with wearing
MOPP gear, improper response to alarm
conditions, etc
Implement vehicle licenses into UTC training
requirements.
Staying current in ACLS, ATLS, PALS
certification is essential in a deployed
environment.
Medical Groups need to deploy their best (not
their worst) members. Lack of adequately
trained and motivated personnel are being
deployed without opportunity to complete
training necessary for mission
accomplishment.
More training in the use of side arms was
necessary. The management of weapons
was inconsistent. Additionally, other
important security and survival measures
were lacking such as searching personnel for
weapons and using maps for coordinates.

Maj John Cotton, no
location, no unit, Sep 03;
Al Dhafra, 9/19/2003 Capt
Teresa Goodman, Sep 03,
Capt Teresa Goodman,
Sep 03, no unit, no
location-- 386 EMDG, Ali
Al Salem, Suedbeck.
EMF TEAM 2/OIF/JDOTFN/FOB 102, Dec 02-May
03
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Date
Completed
2/23/2005

2/24/2005

2/25/2005

Lack of training is a
recurrent theme.

2/25/2005

All facets of training
seem to require top
down review.

2/25/2005

Synopsis of Issue

12

13
14

I think it is essential for ALL medical people
who are deploying to go to EMEDS training, it
was the best thing I could have done.
Major deficiency noted in training to use the
TRAC2ES, SIMLM, TCAM and other
applications for AFMS personnel deploying to
the AOR.
Add special equipment training (forklift, water
buffalo towing, etc.) for enlisted and selected
officers.

Remarks

321st Expeditionary
Medical Operations
Squadron, Masirah Island
Air Base, Oman, 30 May
2002—04 Sept 2002
HQ ACC AAR Review,
Aug 03 IM/IT presentation,
Col Janice Lee, no date

Good follow up
recommendations.

2/28/2005

Medical System
personnel do not deploy
with EMEDS?

3/1/2005

EMEDS Conference, 2324 May 02 & MacDill AFB,
FL, Jun 03

Added training would
assist EMEDS package
in becoming more selfsufficient.

3/1/2005

Teaching the Federal
Response Plan to
command staff is a step
in the right direction.
Flight line driving
requirements are one of
the basic core
requirements.
Added training would
assist EMEDS package
in becoming more selfsufficient.

3/1/2005

Was this an isolated
incident or a constant
problem with personnel
sourcing this UTC?
Was this an isolated
incident or a constant
problem with personnel
sourcing this UTC?
No comment.

3/2/2005

8/12/2005

506 EMEDS AAR, Kirkuk,
Iraq, 14 September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.

No comment.

8/12/2005

506 EMEDS AAR, Kirkuk,
Iraq, 14 September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.

No comment.

8/12/2005

15

Inadequate training of EMEDS CC/staff to
interact with other disaster assets.

EMEDS Conference, 2324 May 02 & MacDill AFB,
FL, Jun 03

16

EMEDS, CCAT and AE personnel unfamiliar
with flight line operations.

Deployed Medical Care
presentation, Col
Cristianson, no date

17

18
19

20

21

22

Personnel were not trained on Global
Expeditionary Medical System (GEMS)
software prior to deployment resulting in a
high requirement for technical assistance
placed on limited computer support staff.
Medical planners fill requirements via
capability (“spaces”…not “faces”). UTCs not
trained or exercised to standards. Expertise
and capability varied greatly.
Current local readiness training is inadequate
for real world, bare base deployment
situations Extended Reach Concept.
Training: Upon arrival, no 4N0X1s with
ambulance driver’s qualifications were also
certified to drive on the flight line. This
necessitated EOSS personnel taking time to
train them locally.
Training: EMEDS training every two years is
not sufficient for people to maintain
proficiency on deployment specific medical
equipment and databases. These are rarely
used by personnel at home station.
Medical Education and Training: Participated
in medical education and training of EMEDS
personnel, Dust-off medics, and Army medical
staff.

Date
Completed

Source Document

444th EMS, King Faisal
Air Base, Jordan, 16 Jan
03 & 458 EMS, Constanta,
Romania, TSgt Posten, no
date.
BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec 03
BEE Lesson Learned
Power Point, 5-17 Dec 03379th EMEDS Souda Bay,
Greece. 3 Mar - 12 Apr 03
506 EMEDS AAR, Kirkuk,
Iraq, 14 September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.

- 133

3/1/2005

3/1/2005

3/2/2005

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

Synopsis of Issue

Source Document

Remarks

Date
Completed

Training: All potential ambulance drivers
should be qualified/trained in flight line driving
prior to deployment.

506 EMEDS AAR, Kirkuk,
Iraq, 14 September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
506 EMEDS AAR, Kirkuk,
Iraq, 14 September 04-15
January 2005, Colonel
Toussaint.
AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comment.

8/12/2005

No comment.

8/12/2005

No comments.

9/9/2005

Training: The severity and intensity of patient
exposures necessitate a staffing
enhancement consideration. Also, nutritional
medicine has been a huge benefit to the
CASF mission.
Training: Mission staffing adjustments – Flight
Surgeons and Nurses and Medical Techs
would be better able to perform in Balad if
they have recent/current trauma, critical care,
or emergency medicine experience.
Training: Licenses and certifications/licenses
need to be current through the period of
deployment for a member to volunteer. Also,
members need to report with their credentials
or 6-part folders.
Training: Also, some staff members EMT
certifications expired while deployed, resulting
in reassignment to ancillary duties.

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

Training: Early mission assignments are
based on the expectation staff members will
report qualified to perform the mission.
Suggests rolling fleet to ensure each reserve,
guard, or active base has access to train with
various vehicles.
Training: For the CASF, many members
arrived without Ambus or even Bus on their
licenses. Other vehicles of opportunity were
assigned, including HUMVEES, 2 ½ Ton,
Stakebeds and 1 Ton Pickups.
Training: Personnel Reporting without
Certifications and Driver Training –
Approximately 40% of the reporting staff were
without driver’s license certifications in
mission assigned vehicles.
More hands-on training for wartime skills. Inservice training is not enough. Staff with
training from the inner city hospitals had the
best experience and skills.

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

AAR 332nd EMDG,
Colonel Church, 5 March4 June 2004.

No comments.

9/9/2005

Maj Bischel, Chief Nurse
+25, FFEP4 Qatar,
January 03 - May 03

Line Item Closed via Email DTG 10/19/05
14:37 PM: MEFPAK

Training: Once deployed, personnel must
adapt to and learn/relearn to use the new
equipment. The equipment is also maintained
by a contract company.
Helicopter experience – CASF members need
recent familiarization with the on-load and
offload procedures for UH-60s and Chinook
UH-47s. Army Med Evacs use this airlift.
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10/19/2005

Synopsis of Issue

Source Document

Remarks

Lack of adequately trained and motivated
personnel, Lack of basic medical materials
and supplies

Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem, Germany

Line Item Closed via Email DTG 10/19/05
14:37 PM: MEFPAK

All personnel on the EMEDs package be
trained in its use (this does usually happen in
most bases that have an EMEDs mission)

DR-35 Major Wanda
McFatter, 21 September
2005

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/2/2006

35

36

Deployed personnel without training

DR-35 Major Wanda
McFatter, 21 September
2005
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/2/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Colonel Harris, Consultant
to the Air Force Surgeon
for Endocrinology,
9/28/2005
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/16/2006

34

38

VA ventures or even employing active duty
medical in civilian facilities may need
consideration in order to develop, enhance,
and maintain top-notch clinical skills.
Decreased skill level of military staff may be
an increasing problem.

39

Clinic arena does not allow for the technician
to solidify their new learned profession.

37

43

Additionally, issues were reported where
medical technicians, especially those whose
only work experience has been in clinics, had
difficultly with basic nursing skills i.e.
Continued below
With ever increasing RRC requirements for
training programs and the need for
experienced people in key positionscontinued below
New technicians directly out of technical
school working in the clinic environment or
only work in the in-patient setting for a brief
period of time before moving to the clinic.
Even some of the AF “hospitals” now only see
very low acuity patients.

44

Skills learned in school are never developed.

40

41

42

45
46

47

Issue: The knowledge levels of both nurses
and medical technicians have been
addressed as concerns.
Air Force Medical facilities have scaled down
in-patient to more outpatient services.
Intravenous flow drip rates, starting
intravenous lines, common illness signs and
symptoms etc. Supporting Information:
Reserve nurses, must hold an active nursing
license
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Date
Completed
10/19/2005

Synopsis of Issue

Source Document

Remarks

Date
Completed

48

The training for the FFGKV is inadequate.

Major William Satterfield,
60 MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

49

In-service training is not enough. Staff with
training from the inner city hospitals had the
best experience and skills.

Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight, 3
October 2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

The FFGKV was not properly trained on joint
service policies and standards.

Major William Satterfield,
60 MDOS/SGOH, 21
September 2005, UAE.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Assign new medical technicians to inpatient
units directly out of school for solidification of
education from tech school.
Also, look at duty assignments and alternation
between clinic facilities and in-patient facilities
to maintain skill levels.
Ensure deployable facilities are provided
educational material for in-field OJT.

Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.
Penelope F. Gorsuch,
Maj, USAF, NC, 3 October
2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
October 2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem, Germany,
3 October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
October 2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem, Germany,
3 October 2005.
Maj Leolyn Bischel,
Maternal-Child Flight
Commander,
Spangdahlem, Germany,
3 October 2005.

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

Posted to IC database.
Follow on analysis.

1/23/2006

50

51
52
53
54

55

Explore other avenues of maintaining skill
levels, i.e. expand CSTARS to more
individuals, VA ventures, civilian ventures with
local communities.
Lack of adequately trained and motivated
personnel.

56

Medical Groups need to deploy their best (not
their worst) members. We had one nurse sent
because her unit wanted to get rid of her.

57

More hands-on training for wartime skills.

58

Basic nursing care needs to be emphasized.

59

More training on chemical and biological
agents, detection, and treatment.
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Appendix D: Final Content Analysis Coding Form
Directions: Place a positive sign (“+”) or negative sign (“-“) in the box to the right of the
indicated lesson learned to denote the positive or negative nature of finding reported in
the indicated lesson learned.
Lesson
Learned
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Nature of Finding:
(positive or negative)

Lesson
Nature of Finding:
Learned (positive or negative)
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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